"THE GOOD LIFE"
(The East-West Meeting in Canberra)
I
By A. N. Prior

This is a sort of rough diary—not an art-form I'm much used to, and I doubt if I'm much good at it, but it may communicate a little at least of what it is trying to communicate, viz. what went on at the East-West philosophical 'working party' held at Canberra under Unesco auspices in December, 1957. A few basic details to begin with. General topic: The Good Life, broken down to 7 sub-topics for discussion purposes; one further discussion day kept free to be filled in when we knew better what else we wanted, and filled-in in fact by discussions arising from some notes by Das (Calcutta) on the good life generally and by Hakim (Lahore) on the good life and religious faith. Delegates present from Australia were A. and Q. Boyce Gibson, Stout, Partridge, Passmore, Baier, Fox, Grey. From India Kabir (a Cabinet Minister whose obvious enjoyment of this philosophical interlude in a busy life was a constant stimulus to everyone), Nikam, Wadia, Das (something of an absolute idealist and thus more of what we were expecting than some), Daya (young, brilliant and with his mind visibly pulled in a variety of directions at once by sociology, existentialism, logic, the East, the West). From New Zealand Mackie, Prior. From Pakistan Sharif (studied under Moore, Russell, Johnson, McTaggart in Cambridge in the early days and has somehow preserved the spirit of *Principia Ethica* almost intact), Hakim (leading Moslem liberal theologian, studied in Heidelberg in the 20's, admires William James. I am sure that if someone who had just read Passmore's new book said 'Hands up all Personal Idealists', Hakim's hand would have been up like a shot).

N.B. and again N.B.: I have eked out notes by reminiscence as best I could, and make no pretence to complete accuracy of detail. Still less do I claim to present things in proportion—I

have remembered best (a) what I was most interested in, and (b) what I said myself, so items of both these sorts will figure more largely here than they did in the original show. Moreover, I am going to abuse my present position by putting into footnotes what I wish I had said at the time but didn't (you know how it is).

DAY 1: 'ETHICAL CONFLICTS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS'

STOUT (opening with WADIA): How far is it a philosopher's business, anyhow, to solve ethical conflicts? He can confront us with various 'ways of life' and clarify the relations between them, but after that can't help much—each man must make up his own mind. The philosopher too, of course, but *qua* man, not *qua* philosopher.

There's a place for reasoning in morals, but only to justify a particular course of action by showing how it fits a chosen 'way of life'; rational justification of 'ways of life' themselves is not possible. Some say even that there's no right or wrong about ways of life; some that there's a right way of life for each person, or for a person of a given temperament, circumstances, etc.; some that there's only one right way of life, no matter who you are.

Of these alternatives, A.K.S. thought No. 3 intolerably intolerant and inclined to favour No. 2.

BAIER: Are 2 and 3 really in conflict? We might distinguish between a personal 'way of life' and a society's 'morality'; perhaps there is only one right morality, into which different individuals might fit in different ways.

PRIOR: The laws of the one right morality, if there is one, might be hypothetical—'It is morally binding on every person to live in such-and-such a way *if* he is a pyknic type with independent means, in such-and-such a different way *if* he's something else, etc.' (Someone doubted whether propositions of this logical structure count as 'laws').

KABIR: Philosophy need not be as remote from practical problems as Stout says. It can at least resolve artificial conflicts by showing that they *are* artificial, as I think the conflict between the moralities of the 'free' and the communist countries might partly be.

STOUT: I wish I could believe that.

HAKIM: For philosophers to give up the attempt to influence practice is to give up their birthright. The good life is the reasoned-out life, and philosophers must teach people to reason. It would be a good thing if we all got together to solve some practical problem.

Das: You have neither the capacity nor the experience to do anything of the kind.

(Stout and others repeat that reasoning about practical matters can only take us so far and no further).

Sharif: There must be intuition, but we do not intuit the goodness of ways of life—we intuit what is good, and reason out what way of life will best serve it.

Mackie: Sometimes we do 'justify' ways of life this way, but sometimes we do the opposite—justify a judgment of a thing's goodness by showing how it fits in with a way of life. We do both, one at one time and one at another time. And why shouldn't we? . . .

Prior and Grey thought this talk of choosing ways of life, even as attributed to 'men' rather than philosophers, artificial. Do we *ever* sit down and deliberate about what way of life we'll adopt, and then adopt it? That is, a 'way of life' in Stout's sense, not just a career.

Partridge: This is taking unfair advantage of the stability of our society; choices of 'ways of life' are real enough in areas and times of tension.

Passmore: One may also choose a way of life without at the time realising that that is what one is doing.

(There was some discussion of how a 'way of life' in the sense of a career can bring in its train a 'way of life' in the sense of a whole moral outlook. Debt to Partridge's teaching and published writings acknowledged here.)

Day 2: Action and Contemplation: (a) Contemplation

This was really two discussions, one led by Daya on contemplation, one by Prior on action. For obvious reasons I have a much clearer memory of the latter than of the former. In the former we angled dialectically for Contemplation as the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's dialogue angled for the Sophist, Daya and Das doing most of the responding; but I don't think we caught our fish. Is contemplation a kind of thinking? No— in thinking we are seeking and casting about; we contemplate what we have found. Is it then gloating over what we have found? Is it day-dreaming? Daya inclined to say that it included both of these, Das that it didn't. Why is it described as inward-turning? —is it introspective psychology? Does the whole idea presuppose a pantheistic unity of the self and the not-self? For both respondents, No.

DAY 2: (b) ACTION AND FORESIGHT

PRIOR: I call action what results from decision, and intelligent decision involves finding out as much as we can about the situation we are in, but logically cannot involve finding out (i.e. before we decide) what we are going to do. It would be absurd to say 'I know that I shall do X, so now I decide to do X'—just as absurd as to say 'I know that I shall do X, so now I decide *not* to do X'. Further, if we are really deciding, *no one else* can know beforehand what we are going to do. For then in principle they could convey this knowledge to us, and then the case would be as before. Or we might use Jonathan Edwards's argument against those who think God's foreknowledge consistent with freewill because foreknowledge doesn't *cause* a thing to happen any more than any other knowledge does. Edwards said that just because knowledge is the effect rather than the cause of the thing known, what is foreknown is to that extent as if it had already been (for it already has effects), and as inevitable. Edwards's moral was 'So much the worse for freewill', mine 'So much the worse for omniscience', but the argument's the same for both of us.

HAKIM: We have had this dispute in Islam too, and there was one great modern teacher, Iqbal, who believed in freedom so strongly that he thought God's omniscience had to be limited.

GIBSON (i.e. here and below, Melbourne Gibson): In this dispute I am with Bergson, and Iqbal, and Prior—and Edwards too, on the logical point; to attempt to hold freewill *and* foreknowledge of the thing willed, in the manner of Aquinas[1] and Flew, seems to me quite inconsistent.

MACKIE (defending Aquinas and Flew): I agree that it is absurd to say 'I know that I shall do X, so now I decide to do it'; it is like 'I know the solution to this problem, so now I shall proceed to solve it'. But there's nothing wrong with 'I know the solution to this problem, and now *he* will proceed to solve it'; nor is there with 'I know that he will do X, and now he will decide to do it'.

PRIOR: Solving a theoretical problem and deciding what to do are alike in that each is the closing of a gap, and cannot take place if the gap is already filled. With the problem-solving it's just a gap in a man's knowledge; in the other case it's a *gap in the*

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[1] The Angelic Doctor is with the angelic party on the main point, all the same. He insists, *De Veritate* II 12, that future contingents are not and cannot be known to God, or man *as* future, and so far as I can see agrees with Aristotle that 'There will be a sea-battle tomorrow', *in that form*, has neither truth nor falsehood before the event is determined. (See below: 'gap in the facts').

facts. When it isn't yet the case that I am going to do X, and isn't yet the case that I'm going to refrain from doing X, my decision is needed to make one of these things the case. But if it isn't yet the case that I shall do X I can't know that I shall do X, *and neither can anyone else;* similarly with the other alternative.

BAIER: But 'being the case' isn't the sort of thing that it makes sense to attach a time-qualification to.

PRIOR: Why not?—in common speech we say that whereas yesterday Jones was a hungry man today this is no longer the case.

PASSMORE: In common speech we also say 'I know how he is going to decide'.

PRIOR: Common speech has a strong and a weak sense of 'decide'.

MACKIE: Suppose you take yourself to be making, over a long period, a series of 'decisions', and then I suddenly come forth with a certain Mr. Smith, who all the time has been predicting what you will do, and has been right every time. Would this give you any inclination to withdraw the claim to have been making decisions?

PRIOR: Yes.

MACKIE: So that it *might* be that you never make decisions at all, in your sense of 'decision'?

PRIOR: Yes.

STOUT: But surely the decision-making people *par excellence,* the strong-willed people, are precisely the most predictable people, because their actions flow directly from their character, and it is the *weak*-willed man, tossed about by every passing whim or circumstance, that is unpredictable.

GIBSON: I question that. The really strong character, like Churchill, has a big streak of unpredictability—you can depend on him as far as the broad aims are concerned, but can't tell how he will fill in the details.

(Had an interesting discussion with Sharif afterwards. He wanted to know what this 'case' is that English philosophers are always talking about; it's very hard to translate (in phrases like 'that isn't the case'). Told him to me it meant nothing—I like to form tenses by prefixes; 'It will be that —', 'It was that —' would do, but idiom requires 'It will be the case that —', 'It was the case that —'; but this means no more than the other. Sharif thought Russell had given the phrase philosophical importance, and used it to mean timeless truth: 'The case'—the permanent fact—is that such-and-such.)

Day 3: Self and Others

Passmore offered five 'paradigm cases' of the relation between self and others, that had been emphasised in different types of moral theory: 1. sheer autocratic command and unquestioning obedience; 2. action from a quite impersonal sense of duty, e.g. an engine-driver's care of the passengers in his train; 3. something of the same sort but with rather more awareness of the personalities of the people one has to deal with, e.g. a legislator's relation to the citizens for whom he is legislating; 4. Participation with others in a common task, e.g., a piece of scientific investigation, in which one 'forgets oneself' through absorption in the object; 5. deliberate withdrawal from others, which can never be complete because the others have made a mark which one inevitably carries with one into one's supposed seclusion.

Everyone found these 'five types of ethical theory' very memorable; of the discussion I remember mainly (a) Gibson's insistence that Type 2 must not be undervalued, (b) Mackie's querying of Passmore's assertion that in Type 4 activities the distinction between self and others disappears. J.A.P. admitted when pressed that what he had said was a Gaskingism, i.e. false but illuminating rather than unilluminating but true. Some discussion too, if I remember rightly, about whether, under 4, it doesn't matter what object you're absorbed in, Mackie reiterating his point of Day 1 (i.e. sometimes we justify an enthusiasm by its goal, sometimes *vice versa*).

Day 4: The Conquest of Suffering

Opened by Gibson and Nikam, the latter doing duty for Murti, who in the end couldn't come. Both sides caught out by Mackie in a common error, viz. the assumption that all suffering, or anyhow the only suffering worth talking about, is due to frustration of desire, and is therefore to be dealt with either by satisfying the desire or by destroying or abating it or by some mixture of these. As against this, suffering caused by e.g. pricking with a pin (and more serious injury) is so far from being a by-product of desire that it brings into being a desire that wasn't there before, viz. that the chap should stop this pin-pricking or whatever it is.

Gibson (supported by Hakim) also annoyed some of us by describing 'the ordinary well-adjusted citizen' who is 'not outstandingly able' but 'happy to do his duty in that station of life to which it may please God to call him', as 'the salt of the earth, an object lesson to philosophers, and the pivot of any tolerable social policy'. (I quote his pre-circulated paper).

Day 5: The Notion of a Moral Law

Opened by Nikam and Baier. What all of us will remember most clearly about the former's pre-circulated paper is that on p. 4 he says that 'No universal moral principle will tell (the agent) *what* he ought to do in a possible moral situation', but he must 'discover this afresh' in each situation; whereas on p. 7 he says that 'moral examples do not yield moral principles: on the contrary, (it is) *because* there are moral principles that we judge an action to be an example of moral goodness'. An odd discussion was touched off by Daya's juxtaposing these two passages and asking the author what he meant by it—a little naughtily, perhaps, since no one exhibited so much of the bold free spirit of Whitman's 'I contradict myself? Well then, I contradict myself', as this same Daya.

Both openers were found naturalistically fallacious by some of the party, Nikam because he described 'Dharma' as being at once the True and the Good (to Sharif's distaste, I think), Baier because he argued that morality is an affair of Reason in some sense in which legality is only an affair of Will (against this, from all quarters: the place of 'the choice of the soul' in morality). But critics as well as openers were being rounded up by the anti-naturalists this day; e.g. Hakim. Baier had made it his business to contrast morality and law in order to establish that 'moral law' is a category mistake, and to this end had said that morality has no sanctions; but Hakim argued that the immoral man, even if he suffers in no other way, damages his real self. Mackie objected to this way of describing what the immoral man suppresses; as well he might—the thing was surely out of the same disreputable old box as Nikam's true-good Dharma and Baier's story of the right being the rational and the rational the right.

The 'moral law' solecism, according to Baier, originally arose as a vain attempt to break through the descriptive-prescriptive dichotomy. A possibly more successful attempt to do the same thing was made in the discussion by Sharif, who held that 'ought' statements go into neither pigeon-hole. That they do not go into the prescriptive one was supported by the observation (by someone whose identity I have forgotten, but he was a Linguistic Analyst) that you can put obligation-statements into the past tense, but cannot do this with prescriptions.

Days 6 and 7: The Good Life and Citizenship, and Ethics and International Relations

I am going to leave these Days out of this record, because what Das said about Hakim on Day 1 would have been dead right if said about Prior. (There's space to be thought of, too).

DAY 8: (a) PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

DAS: Man is body, mind and spirit; mind partly depends on body but is higher, and spirit is related similarly to mind. We cannot ignore the body completely, but should not make too much of its needs. A truly good life can be lived almost under any political or economic conditions. At worst we shall suffer political bondage or economic poverty, but our soul may remain free and our mind active and vigorous.

Science is the work of the mind, while philosophy, art and morality are activities of the spirit. Science is outward-turning; sense-bound; it amasses factual information; seeks knowledge of objects; can and does prove its theses. But Philosophy does not give knowledge, cannot prove anything, has no presuppositions. It is never content with high probability, but seeks to arrive at truth, that is absolute clarity and self-evidence. Philosophy recognizes no absolute *data* but demands that everything be explained. That is an ideal not yet reached, and Philosophy must be content in the meantime with doubts and beliefs, but only in the meantime.

PASSMORE: This is pure Bradley.[2]

STOUT: What is this Truth that is so different from knowledge, information, belief, and that no one has yet attained? Surely we have some true beliefs, and what truth is there beyond this 'agreement with the facts' that some of our beliefs have?

DAS: I once thought that also, but am now more sceptical. For what is it that *is* true on the correspondence theory?— '*That two and two are four* is true', '*That grass is green* is true'; what are these objects named by 'that'-clauses?[3] Are they 'propositions'? But I doubt whether such things exist. Philosophical truth is not correspondence but clarity—truth is that which does not lead to any further questions.

PASSMORE: But every truth we discover *does* raise further questions, and it is precisely this that makes discovery such a valuable activity.

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[2] Perfectly right, of course (and Das agreed); but oddly enough a lot of it *sounded* pure Wittgenstein, e.g. all this about no philosophical knowledge, no philosophical proofs. Product of a common anxiety to *demarcate a distinctive field* for philosophy; anyone who thinks this can be done will talk a *bit* like this.

[3] If a modest man had been able to get a word in edgeways in this discussion, he could have answered this by asking, 'Why punctuate these sentences this way?' Certainly if you write '(that 2 + 2 = 4) is true' you seem to have a verb 'is true', forming a sentence out of a name, and so must ask what this name names; but if you write 'That (2 + 2 = 4) is true' you can see that you just have an auxiliary 'That— is true' or 'It is true that—' which forms a sentence out of a sentence, and to the question 'What does the *sentence* name?' the answer is just 'Sentences aren't names'.

PARTRIDGE: Das says science is 'sense-bound'; but beauty is sense-bound too.

DAS: Beauty is not merely of the eyes.

DAYA: But it's the same with Science, so why is not it also an activity of the spirit?

DAS: Artistic activity is self-expressing, and spiritual for that reason.

DAYA: It is the object, not the activity, that is 'beautiful'.

DAS: But a scientific theory is no more than a passive representation of the object. What else is science?

PRIOR: A work of art.

DAS: Then it's all right—it is very spiritual.

PRIOR: I don't mean to be just negative. I don't know what is the real distinction between science and philosophy, and I would like to.

DAS: Philosophy is turned inward where Science is turned outward. 'I know there is a table'—that is Science. 'I know that I know there is a table'—this is Philosophy.   ,

DAYA: Then there would be knowing that you know that you know, etc.—there are mental diseases where you go on and on like that.

SOME CAD: Modal Logic?

DAYA: (Later on—fragments from a tirade; D. was grand at these): Das's paper illustrates some errors to which Indian thinkers are prone. For example, there is an assumption in it that social institutions leave you to yourself; but do they? They don't in modern communist countries, with their brain-washing etc.; so if as philosophers we want to be left to ourselves, we have an active interest in preserving those institutions that will allow this.

Then one can't ignore the effect of economic depression on the mind. Is a St. Francis possible in a highly industrialised society?

Indians tend to misunderstand scientific activity too. Verification is essential to it, yes; but that doesn't make you as 'sense-bound' as Das says. Beauty is sense-bound to an extent to which perhaps even science is not. And the Indian mind has been underplaying the æsthetic activity in science, confusing it with technology. Perhaps the fallacy comes from a distrust of *power*. Das wants freedom but doesn't want power. This distrust is wrong.

DAY 8: (b) THE GOOD LIFE AND RELIGIOUS FAITH

HAKIM: We might discuss such questions as these: Is the good life basically different in different religions? *Ceteris paribus,* is a good life led by an unbeliever an inadequate life? Is religion necessary to the good life? If religions offer different views of the good life, by what criteria are we to judge their comparative validity or merit? Are institutional and dogmatic religions divisive and therefore against the good life? Does the addition of religion to science, etc. make people better persons? What is the use of religion?

MACKIE: There's a bias about these questions—there are exceptions, but most of them suggest that the choice is between regarding religion as an aid to the good life and regarding it as quite apart from the good life. In fact I think it hostile to the good life, because of the value it always puts upon firm belief for inadequate reasons. It blocks inquiry, which is a principal ingredient of the good life.

GIBSON: The question is whether inquiry is meant to find something out, or is just like a puppy chasing its tail. I want to get something at the end of it, not just to ask questions in order to find out more questions to ask. (Reference to Passmore in previous discussion).

HAKIM: I would like to know if people have changed their attitude to religion, and how this has been connected with their philosophy.

PASSMORE: I must say that one of the main things that turned *me* against religion was a very great distaste for Christian ethics.

HAKIM: Is this other, i.e. non-Christian, type of ethics related to other faiths?

PASSMORE: I should hope not.

GIBSON: It should be explained to our visitors that Passmore came very much under the influence of Professor Anderson of Sydney, whose philosophy is a kind of inverted religion.

PASSMORE: The change of which I spoke occurred before I was a student of Professor Anderson's.

DAS: I have a respect for religious people—they are vastly preferable to statesmen, businessmen and so forth—they are not slaves to practicality—but I haven't a very high opinion of organised religion. Nobody can have religious beliefs without believing that his own form of religion is best.

PRIOR: Surely there's nothing peculiar to religion in this—you can't have a belief about anything, however trivial, e.g. a belief that there's a blue pencil in Das's pocket, without believing that your own belief is the true one. What's wrong with this?[4]

PASSMORE: It's the *importance* attached to religious beliefs that's bad—the way you're damned for not having the right ones.[5]

DAYA: How far is Das's own earlier point of view different from a religion? His view of philosophy as an activity of the spirit has something very near to a religion about it . . . .

MACKIE: Does the non-religious man 'miss something'? I don't believe it, but even if religious belief did add something to life, this would not be evidence for the truth of the belief.

BAIER: Such a man may have enriched his life, but perhaps illegitimately, e.g. by believing falsehoods.

DAYA: What's so wrong with believing falsehoods? It ought to be seriously considered how far falsehood is actually necessary for social stability and spiritual life.

STOUT: Religion is supposed to add zest to life, but are all zests good? Are there not bad zests?

GIBSON: My change of attitude has been in the opposite direction from Passmore's, and what primarily took me to Christianity and holds me there is an overpowering need for worship and the deprivation I should feel if I were without it— I would lose my sense of humour and get lost in political wrangles. But arguments have their place, and metaphysical beliefs enter into the structure of religion—I don't approve of these present believing positivists who try to keep their philosophy and their religion in different baskets.

DAYA: But we *ought* to have different baskets for different things.

BAIER: Perhaps Gibson's desire for worship is one that he should learn to control. Would he not feel an obligation to do this if he became convinced somehow that God didn't exist?

GIBSON: If I found myself in that state of mind I would first ask what was wrong with myself; I am much more likely to have made a mistake than that the whole Christian tradition should be wrong.

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[4] Cf. Berkeley, *Alciphron* I, XV.

[5] I ought to say I'm entirely with J.A.P. here, and remember with pleasure some lectures J. N. Findlay gave before he discovered that God's existence was disprovable, in which he expressed the view that God exists but is not worried about whether His existence is admitted or not, and in fact prefers to have some people disbelieving it. Cf. also Hume's Dialogues XII, not to mention Matt. XXV. 31 ff. and Isaiah XLV. 15.

BAIER: But look—surely you'll agree that worship entails the existence of God, and it follows that *if* the existence of God is disproved, worship must go, and if that's emotionally hard, we must lump it.

SHARIF: Surely it's only *belief* in God's existence that worship entails.[6]

PRIOR: There's a logical possibility that Baier hasn't noticed. 'If God doesn't exist I shouldn't go to Church and God doesn't exist, therefore I shouldn't go to Church'—certainly that's a valid argument; given the premisses the conclusion follows. But the following is just as valid: 'If God doesn't exist I shouldn't go to Church, but I ought to go to Church, therefore God exists'— that's the *modus tollens,* and formally there's nothing wrong with it. You might say that it's inconceivable that anyone should be convinced of both premisses without being previously convinced of the conclusion. With 'going to Church' that's probably so, but change it to 'Only if God exists ought I to respect man's freedom beyond certain limits, but I ought to respect, etc.''[7]—a man might be convinced of these two points, and *then* be driven to a belief in God in order to be consistent. Mackie had an objection to this that there was no time for him to develop.

GENERAL

Notable among the commendable features of this W.P. were: (a) Being the right size, and able in consequence to meet round a committee table instead of this performing-to-an-audience business. (b) Sticking at it for 8 working days plus breaks instead of the normal 3 or 4. (c) Pre-circulation of written papers as long as the authors pleased, but introductory *viva voce* spiels limited to 15 minutes. (d) Being monolingual. I don't say that these things would be as good separately as they were together, but they were certainly good together. Everyone was pleased, too, at the absence of any rigorous tie-up of philosophical opinions with place of origin; as often as not, as I hope the foregoing makes clear, brother strove against brother, and found allies outside his own family.

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[6] In the way, presumably, that 'He is afraid of the Bogeyman' does not entail 'The Bogeyman exists' but only 'He believes etc.' (Does it entail 'The Bogeyman is feared by him'?).

[7] I ought to have gone back to Daya's point and said 'Only if God exists ought we to seek truth regardless of consequences, but we ought, etc.' Passmore tells me that I have here put into words the reasoning by which the average New Zealander convinces himself of God's existence. (Not meant by J. A. P. as a compliment, either to the average N.Z.-er or to me). What does get me tangled is the relation between the given inferences about going to Church and this pair: 'If God exists, go to Church; and He does, so go' and 'Only if God exists, go to Church; and go; so He exists' (statement proved from two commands!)

Main defect: Having to talk about the Good Life, or anyhow go through the motions of this. Without the very generous grant Unesco gave us we couldn't have met; but this laid on our organisers an obligation to set us a topic which would meet with Unesco's approval, and they understood rightly or wrongly that only one of this sort would. If rightly, I could wish Unesco better educated at this point. We were part of a wider project to promote East-West understanding, and I think a pretty valuable bit of this could have been done if this bunch of philosophers, or another, had been set to discussing matters closer to the heart of the subject—I mean, I'm afraid, Logic and Metaphysics. The Good Life is tedious as anything but a by-product. Better the Good Life than nothing at all, however; in any case you'll see from the foregoing that we didn't let it get us down.

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"The Good Life" (East-West Meeting at Canberra):
II

By Humayun Kabir[1]

The East-West Philosophers' Conference which was held in Canberra in December 1957 was in some respects different from similar gatherings of philosophers in recent times. Held under the auspices of UNESCO, it was perhaps one of the first measures undertaken by the organisation to promote its programme for mutual appreciation of the cultural values of East and West. It however differed from the usual UNESCO conference, Round Table or Symposium in two significant respects. Such UNESCO gatherings are usually international in the sense that they include representatives from many countries and traditions. In the Canberra conference, India and Pakistan represented the East while the West was represented by Australia and New Zealand. The organizers felt that it would make for better appreciation and understanding of one another's point of view if the participants formed a more or less homogeneous group. Where people from many countries and cultural traditions come together, they have to spend a large part of their effort and energy in seeking to overcome their differences. Understanding therefore becomes more difficult and also more diffuse. India and Pakistan are politically two separate countries but the people share a common historical past and common cultural and philosophical traditions. Similarly, except to an Australian or a New Zealander the differences between their two countries are not easily discovered.

The second way in which the Canberra Conference differed from usual UNESCO gatherings was that the participants concentrated on one single problem and lived together for a period of about two weeks. It is true that the problem was one which has ramifications in every sphere of human life, thought and action. All the same, concentration on one problem allowed the participants an opportunity of coming into closer intellectual contact with one another than would have been otherwise possible. The fact that they were living together gave further opportunities for informal discussions and contacts. These were generally even more fruitful for better mutual understanding than formal

[1] Professor Kabir is President of the Indian Philosophical Congress and has recently been appointed Minister of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs in the Indian Government.

discussions. The excellent hospitality provided by the National University assured the physical and material conditions of the good life. The participants seemed to agree that the other conditions of the good life were also not lacking in their mutual intercourse!

I have mentioned earlier that Australia and New Zealand represented the West while India and Pakistan represented the East. One need not even look at a map to realise that India and Pakistan are geographically to the west of New Zealand and Australia. In fact, the futility of applying geographical labels to the spheres of life and thought was one of the major lessons of this Conference. Differences among the participants cut across racial, cultural and national boundaries. There were occasions when a man from India or Pakistan became the staunchest defender of a position which is normally associated with the Western European outlook. On other occasions, a philosopher of Australia or New Zealand defended vehemently a value usually associated with the East against criticism made by a member from India or Pakistan.

It proved impossible to group the philosophers from any country under the label eastern or western. What was of even greater interest was the constant change in their respective positions. Two philosophers from India and Pakistan would combine with a philosopher from New Zealand to defend a particular position against the concerted attack of all the others, but very soon one found that the three who seemed so united in their intellectual outlook were sharply divided on some other point. In fact, one of the most fascinating features of the Conference was the constant variation in the combination of exponents and critics. One may say that there were all possible (and in some cases impossible) permutations and combinations of the philosophers in their quest of what *The Good Life* means.

In a discussion centering on the *Good Life,* it was inevitable that the emphasis should constantly shift from the individual through the community to the world. There was general consensus that suffering was an inescapable element in individual experience but there could be no agreement as to how this suffering is to be overcome. Some held that it was through renunciation that suffering can be conquered. Others challenged the very concept of renunciation and said that a stoic acceptance of one's fate is the essence of human wisdom. Others still made a distinction between suffering and the attitude to suffering. Suffering is a fact and cannot be denied. The possibility of eliminating or even reducing it is severely limited by facts over

which the individual has no control. The attitude to suffering is however a different matter. Here there is scope for individual differences, and even the philosophers could agree that the quality of an individual is determined by the way he reacts to suffering in himself and others.

The discussion did not however stop with individual suffering. It is hard to say where individual suffering ends and suffering in the community begins. In fact, a good deal of suffering of the individual is due to his relations with other individuals. In such a relationship, communal factors have already become a dominant element. I have already said that it would be not only wrong but dangerous to try to divide attitudes into rigidly western or rigidly eastern. Nevertheless one may refer to a paradox which appeared again and again during the course of the discussions. This is perhaps one of the basic differences in the philosophical attitude of the people of the East and West. Having said this, I must hasten to add that there are distinguished exceptions to this general tendency in both the Eastern and the Western tradition.

One may say that philosophy in the East has usually claimed to be a practical discipline, while in the West the emphasis has gradually shifted to problems of knowledge and logic. In ethics, the eastern attitude has on the whole been more concerned with the problem of evil and suffering in their metaphysical aspect. At the same time, the eastern attitude has tended to minimise the scope of action in fighting them. Western ethics has, on the other hand, tended to concentrate more on the epistemological implications of suffering and evil. At the same time, the western approach to suffering has been more pragmatic and positive.

The Conference recognised quite early in the course of discussion that the *Good Life,* if it is to be realised at all, will have to transcend the limits of individual or even community life. This transcendence of communal or national life is one of the great changes of recent times. A Greek or an ancient Indian could perhaps define the *Good Life* in terms of his citizenship. Today, there can be no meaning in the concept of *Good Life* except in its international implications. It has become a part of our cultural heritage that the individual must develop neighbourly relations with members of his family, clan and nation. The obligation to members of other nations has not till now been a part of the system of duties of the average citizen. Still less has the question of the relation of one nation to another been considered on the moral plane. It is one of the paradoxes of the modern world that conduct which is condemned in unconditional

terms when it occurs within a community is often the object of
commendation and admiration when it operates in the field of
relations between nations. Here also, the divisions and differences
between the individual philosophers were unrelated to their race,
religion or country.

One may perhaps conclude this brief review by saying that
the Conference proved, if fresh proof was necessary, that human
beings exhibit much the same tendencies and ways of thought in
spite of differences in racial, religious or cultural background.
Philosophers usually disagree, but there was general agreement
that one condition of the good life is transcendence of individual
interests. This transcendence may take the form of asceticism or
of identification with a group or an ideal, but whatever form it
may take, it must be there in some sense to constitute the good
life. Intellectual attitudes differ, but perhaps the basic division
between men are between the optimists and the pessimists. I
would say that the traditionalists are on the whole pessimists.
They fear that the bark of human culture is a frail vessel among
the uncertainties of an inhospitable world. In such an environ-
ment, we should hold to what we have. To deviate from an
accepted belief or practice is to take risks that are not justified.
The optimists, on the other hand, have greater faith in man's
capacity to face the unknown. They are not afraid of cutting
away from the shore and launching their frail craft in the vast
ocean of the unknown. In fact they feel that without this
quality of adventure and risk, the human heritage will not grow.
There may be uncertainties but there is also the promise of
achievements yet unknown.

New Delhi.

B

THE NATURE OF VALUE JUDGEMENTS

By Daya Krishna

A value-judgement is the assertion or denial of a value-predicate of some object or state of affairs. It shall not be the task of this paper to elucidate the nature of value-predicates. Rather, it shall only be concerned with pointing out an implicit characteristic of value-judgements which explains, to a certain extent, the general feeling that a value-predicate cannot be reduced without a residuum to some other term or terms describing empirical or non-empirical objects or situations. Such a feeling was voiced powerfully by Moore in his *Principia Ethica*. Since then, many different reasons have been offered for the position. The contentions of this paper may possibly prove slightly more adequate for the purpose, though their interest is hardly exhausted by that context alone.

It is not always that we feel a value-judgement to be incapable of being *fully*[1] translated in terms of another judgement which does not contain any term denoting value. Most people will agree that, in certain circumstances, the statement "I like coffee" is a valid translation of the statement "coffee is good". Why, then, do we not feel the same way about other translations of statements in which value-terms occur? There certainly are value-statements which many would accept as 'persuasive definitions' or as 'covert imperatives' or as ordinary 'declaratives' denoting desire or approval, or even just as 'interjectory exclamations' expressing emotion. But it is equally true that most persons would find some occasion when they would refuse to accept such a translation as conveying *completely* what they wanted to convey. Such are the occasions when a value-judgement may be said to be made *'seriously'*. The 'seriousness' does not denote any psychological fact. It is, in fact, merely another name for the situation in which we refuse to accept any non-valuational translation as adequate for a value-judgement.

The fact has, of course, been noted by many ethical thinkers. But few have attempted to understand what exactly is involved in such a refusal. The very attempt would seem inadmissible to many who have subscribed to the 'indefinability doctrine' of

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[1] We are obviously ignoring the complex problems recently raised about "synonymity". If no two expressions can be synonymous, the problem is irrelevant for our purpose. On the other hand, if they can sometimes be synonymous, it is equally irrelevant for our purpose, since it is our contention that in such cases we generally grant identity of meaning.

Moore and others. Those, however, who urge that an adequate translation is possible insistently demand a differential characteristic which may show the value-judgement to be irreducible to other types of judgements.

Such a characteristic, we suggest, may be found in an implicit commitment which is involved in a value-judgement when it is seriously made. The commitment is to a system of value-judgements which valuationally cohere with each other. A value-judgement, when seriously made, involves the commitment to modify it if shown that one holds a value-judgement which is incompatible with it. The commitment is mostly implicit and, as we shall see further, it does not necessarily involve the giving up of either of the two incompatible value-judgements but only the recognition that such an incompatibility should not be.

The nature of this implicit commitment may become slightly more clear if we test the proposed translation with reference to it. The use of a value-judgement as a 'covert persuasive definition', for example, does not commit one not to use a different, or even opposed, definition at some other time. Similarly, a 'command' involves no commitment that a contradictory command will not be issued later on or that such a command, if issued, would prove the invalidity of the former one. The same is the case with the proposed translations in terms of 'desiring', 'feeling', 'liking' or 'willing'. None of these commits the speaker to any system of coherent 'desires', 'feelings', 'likings' or 'willings' and one does not feel unjustified if one switches over to a different set of them.

Such is certainly not the situation with respect to a value-judgement which is seriously made. One does feel called upon to account for or modify a contradiction if one's attention gets called to it in any way. A value-judgement is thus supposed to involve a coherent system of value-judgements in whose context alone it is supposed to acquire validity. The parallel with a statement in the logico-mathematical or the empirical sciences may perhaps help in understanding the matter.

The statement "Two plus two equals four" is, by itself, not much of a mathematical statement. It becomes so only when we treat it as consistently following from a set of postulates which give rise to many such statements all of which form a coherent system together. This, of course, is only a commitment to an ideal situation which, by the very nature of the case, can never be realised. But it is only in the perspective of this commitment that the mathematical enterprise has any significance or meaning. The search for a set of postulates from which every possible mathematical statement could be deductively derived and which would

not give rise to any contradictory statements within itself meets an insuperable difficulty in what is known as Gödel's theorem. Even otherwise, the extension of the field of mathematical statements would perhaps have been so continuous as to require a constant revision of the postulational set to be adequate for the derivation of the statements in the new fields. However, at least theoretically, a *final* postulational set would have been possible but for Gödel's proof that a statement can always arise in any mathematical system which is not provable within that system.

Similarly, an empirical statement such as "The breeze is blowing" has, by itself, nothing scientific about it. The scientific enterprise starts with the attempt to see the fact denoted by such a statement as related to other facts denoted by other statements. The commitment ultimately is to a completely coherent system of all empirical statements, from any of which, with the help of generalised principles, others may be reached. Such an ideal, of course, is intrinsically impossible of achievement. Empirical facts are not something finished and final in their nature. They do not merely change, but change their ways of behaviour as well. The relative autonomy of empirical systems and the probabilistic interactions between different such systems tend in the same direction as well. But, however impossible of achievement the ideal may be, it alone provides direction and meaning to the scientific activity of man.

The search for coherence that sustains the scientific activity is, it should be noted, empirical and not logical in nature. The coherence that is sought is not deductive in character. The very meaning of empirical concepts is determined not so much by definition as by the behaviour of the objects to which they refer. It is because of this that there is always an element of indeterminacy in them. There are always marginal cases where it is difficult to know if the concept applies or not. It is the requirements of 'application' and 'verification' that distinguish empirical concepts and judgements from other types of concept and judgement. It may be difficult to elucidate completely the nature of this difference; but that there is such a difference can hardly be doubted.[2]

Parallel with the seeking for logical and empirical coherence in the logico-mathematical and the empirical sciences, there is, we suggest, the search for value-coherence in the axiological sciences.

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[2] Many people think that the Law of Contradiction is the sufficient ground for coherence both in the logico-mathematical and the empirical sciences. The confusions involved in this view have been exposed, at some length, in my paper "Law of Contradiction and Empirical Reality", in *Mind*, April, 1957. But this does not mean that there is no principle of coherence involved in the empirical sciences. The nature of this principle, however, has been elucidated neither there nor here.

The commitment to a system of axiologically coherent value-judgements is, of course, only an ideal one. But it is in the perspective of that ideal commitment alone that the valuational seeking of man makes sense. We start with immediate value-judgements and gradually find that they conflict with each other. Many times the conflict is a situational one in the sense that it is only because of the nature of physical or social reality that the two values cannot be realised together. Sometimes, however, the conflict is between the values themselves and it is then that we feel that the conflict 'should not be'. The discovery of a new value may modify our attitude to other values. Others which one regarded as absolute may come to be seen as having only a limited and relative validity. There is always the search for general value-principles from which particular value-judgements may be deduced in the context of given specific situations. But the value-principles themselves are tested and modified on the basis of our immediate value-judgements. The interplay between the general and the particular provides, as in other sciences, the dynamics for the continuous movement in the value-sciences.

The coherence to which we feel committed in making a value-judgement is, it should be remembered, only a value-coherence. It is neither empirical coherence, which we meet in the empirical sciences, nor formal coherence, which we meet in the logico-mathematical sciences. If, for example, two statements are empirically coherent, it does not follow that they are valuationally coherent also. Valuational coherence, in other words, cannot be deduced from empirical coherence. Many thinkers who have tried to reduce value-judgements to judgements of empirical facts have failed to see this point. It is generally admitted to-day, though many thinkers in the past seem apparently to have thought otherwise, that statements which are logically coherent may not be empirically so. The establishment of empirical coherence is something over and above the establishment of mere logical coherence between any two statements. The same is, however, not so widely accepted about valuational coherence, mostly because not much attention seems to have been paid to it.

It may be difficult to articulate explicitly the nature of value-coherence. The difficulty derives perhaps mainly from the fact that we tend to think of coherence in logical terms alone. The tendency, however natural it may be, is shown to be misguided by the fact that empirical coherence cannot be derived from logical coherence, nor valuational coherence from the empirical

one. The independence of these coherences is perhaps the most powerful argument for the irreducibility of these realms to each other.

It may be interesting here, however, to ask about the relations of these coherences in reverse. Can we legitimately infer from two statements which are empirically coherent the further fact that they are logically coherent also? Similarly, from two valuationally coherent statements, can a valid inference about their being empirically coherent be made? In other words, does valuational coherence imply empirical coherence and empirical coherence the logical one?

In a sense, it seems that it must be so. The transformation-equations of logical constants and the logic of quantified propositions must be observed, whatever be the values of the variables in the relevant propositions. The purely syntactical rules of formal logic cannot but be observed in the relations between different propositions. But the use of the *relevant* syntactical form is itself significantly determined by the empirical relations holding between the empirical variables themselves. Logic never asks if the initial proposition or set of propositions is true or not. But the empirical sciences cannot even start without asking this question. The adequacy of the initial proposition can, however, be determined only by considering the actual relations obtaining between the empirical values of the variables concerned. The further deduction again depends more on the observed behaviour of the objects concerned than on the syntactical relations of the logical constants used in the propositions. Even such basic laws as the law of contradiction or the law of excluded middle are difficult to apply when the variables are given empirical values. The elaboration of three-valued and multi-valued logics is standing evidence of the fact that when logical structure does not accord with the structure of facts, we are prepared to revise the former in terms of the latter. This, of course, does not mean that there was anything *logically* wrong with the previous structure, but only that it lacked fruitfulness in dealing with empirical reality.

However it be, the answer to the question "does empirical coherence imply logical coherence?" seems possible without deciding the general issue about the relations between logic and empirical reality. Logical coherence means deducibility either from a common set of axioms or from each other. In this sense, empirical coherence cannot be said to imply logical coherence, for it is always possible that two statements which are empirically coherent may not be deducible from each other or even from some common set of axioms. In fact, they rarely would be.

The question whether valuational coherence implies empirical coherence can more easily be answered in the negative. Otherwise, the concepts of 'æsthetic coherence' and 'imaginational reality' would never have arisen and most of fiction, drama and poetry would have been out of bounds for the concept of value. Even the empirical improbability of two values being realised together does not make the valuational judgement 'they are coherent' or that 'they ought to have been realisable together' meaningless. The empirical coherence thus cannot be deduced from valuational coherence even though it may be a necessary pre-condition for the *realisation* of those values.

The independence of these different types of 'coherence' reflects the independence of these realms of study. In each realm, the presupposition of the cognitive enterprise is commitment to the relevant type of 'coherence' in the context of which alone the enterprise becomes meaningful. The search for an 'over-arching coherence' between these different realms is the *leit-motiv* of much philosophical thinking. The unity is sought in terms either of logic or fact or value. The search for some self-evident indubitable premise from which everything could be deduced with a logical or dialectical necessity points to the first as the ultimate source of coherence for these thinkers. At the other extreme are the philosophers who seek a teleological unity in terms of some 'Idea of Good', 'Perfection' or 'God's Will'. In between, we have the seekers of causal unity for whom both logic and values are as much empirical facts as any other.

However, the idea of an 'over-arching coherence', though a natural generalisation from other types of 'coherence', does not appear to be a valid one. This may seem surprising in view of our contention that the other types of coherence too are not intrinsically realisable in their nature, and function merely as ideal commitments in terms of which our cognitive activity makes sense. Similarly, it may be argued, the 'over-arching coherence' is merely an ideal commitment which, even if intrinsically unrealisable, gives sense and direction to our philosophical quest. This would have had some meaning if philosophers were seeking a 'coherence' in terms of something other than logic, fact or value. As, however, the prototype of their coherence is always taken from one of these fields, there is no *new* type of 'coherence' which is *specifically* relevant to their field. The 'over-arching coherence', in fact, is no new coherence but merely a reduction of other types to the one which the philosopher happens to prefer.

The impossibility of such reduction has been seen by most thinkers these days in the case of empirical judgements. They

are all agreed that these can, in no sense, be just reduced to logical statements. But the same thinkers have not yet despaired of the attempt to reduce judgements of value to judgements of matters of fact. Every age seems to have its preferential idea of reality, and the modern seems to find it in 'the sensum of red' rather than in some self-evident axiom in which everything is involved.

A value-judgement, when seriously made, thus involves a commitment to an axiologically coherent system of value-judgements. This commitment is mostly implicit and reveals itself in our refusal to accept its translation in non-valuational terms. In its nature, the commitment is only an ideal one—intrinsically unrealisable and yet necessary to give sense and direction to our explorations in this realm. It shares this quality of commitment with logic and mathematics on the one hand and the empirical sciences on the other. The nature of the commitment is also the same. The differences lie in the nature of that to which the commitment is made. The 'coherence' to which commitment is made in the logico-mathematical, the empirical and the valuational sciences is not the same but rather different in each case. The difference is demonstrated by the *impossibility* of deducing any one type of coherence from any other type. The search for an 'over-arching coherence' is mistaken in its nature as it does not seek any *new* type of coherence and ignores the radical independence of the three types proved by the impossibility of their deduction from each other. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of new types which may be discovered later on or sub-types which may have important relevant differences between themselves.

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IS "WHY SHOULD I BE MORAL?" AN ABSURDITY?

By Kai Nielsen

A

Can we ask, if we are clear that we are not asking for a *moral* justification, for a justification of ethics or morals as an activity? Or, to put it differently, is 'Why should I be moral?' a meaningful question in any context? I wish to argue here, against Toulmin and others, that 'Why should I be moral?' is an intelligible (logically non-absurd) question.[1] We can always ask for a justification for taking a moral point of view at all. This is so because not all questions about conduct (about what is to be done or about what should have been done, etc.) are moral questions. Morals, though a unique mode of reasoning, belongs to a larger mode of reasoning: practical reasoning (reasoning about conduct).

In examining the question of the justification of morals, we must be careful to separate this question from questions about the justification of any particular system of morals or ethics. Rather, we are concerned here with the justification of ethics (any ethics) as an *activity* or as a *mode of reasoning.* Secondly, we must be quite clear that in asking for a justification of morals we are not asking for a moral justification of morals, for to ask this latter question (as Kant pointed out to us long before Toulmin), is to ask for the absurd; for, in asking for a justification of morality, one has already put oneself beyond moral considerations altogether. I am asking here if one can intelligibly ask for a justification of morals itself as a rational activity. In asking this question, I am asking a question about morality for which morality itself cannot supply the answer.[2] In other words, this question is just not the sort of question we can ask from a moral point of view. Yet, may we not ask, in the manner of Bentham, "Well, now what's the good of all this business of morality anyway?"[3] If we recognize that 'good' may have many uses (including non-moral ones), there seems to be no linguistic impropriety in Bentham's question.

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[1] See Stephen Toulmin, *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics,* pp. 160-5. My arguments here also apply against the argument used by A. I. Melden, "Why Be Moral?", *The Journal of Philosophy,* XLV (August 12, 1948), pp. 449-56. For an argument that in certain respects parallels mine see Henry Aiken, "The Levels of Moral Discourse," *Ethics,* Vol. LXII (July, 1952), pp. 245-7.

[2] Aiken, "The Levels of Moral Discourse," *Ethics,* LXII (July, 1952), 246.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 247.

In talking about the relation of religion to ethics, Toulmin claims that one can challenge *normatively* the propriety of the whole religious mode of reasoning.[4] Now could we not say the same thing about the mode of moral reasoning? And, if not, why not? I am suggesting that it is just as possible, though perhaps not practically as feasible, to challenge any moral appeal normatively. The "ultimacy of the moral appeal" can be challenged either in the name of a higher authority (God, the State) or just on the grounds of expediency or personal inclination.

Toulmin seems to regard utterances that I allege are questioning the good of morality *as such* as being logically absurd. He takes the question, 'Why ought one to do what is right anyway?' to be a logically absurd one (taking 'right' and 'ought' in their "simplest senses") because 'ought' and 'right' originate in the same situations and serve the same purposes. In fact, Toulmin argues that such a suggestion is just as unintelligible as the suggestion "that some emerald objects might not be green". For Toulmin, "it is a self-contradiction . . . . to suggest that we 'ought' to do anything but what is 'right' ".[5]

Toulmin's answer needs qualification because of the evaluative meaning of 'ought' and 'right'; but Toulmin's contention about 'Why ought one to do what is right?' also needs qualification in another way, and in this respect it is even more seriously misleading. A moral sceptic asking, 'Why ought one to do what is right, anyway?' might well be questioning the good or the value of the whole activity of morals: the 'ought' in, 'Why ought one to do what is right anyway?' and the 'should' in 'Why should I be moral?' are evaluative expressions but they are not moral expressions.[6] Understood in this fashion, 'Why should I be moral?' or 'Why ought one to do what is right, anyway?' are not unintelligible or logically absurd. Nor does it help Toulmin to argue, in this context, that the evaluative terms are to be taken in their simplest senses. They have many senses and if we are interested in understanding the full scope of the logic of justification in human conduct, we have no right to exclude any one of these natural *uses* as irrelevant. As Aiken points out:

"In emphasizing the limits of moral reasoning which govern the strictly 'ethical' applications of 'ought' or 'right,' they [certain linguistic analysts] forget that such limits are themselves man-

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[4] Toulmin, *The Place of Reason in Ethics*, pp. 219-21.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 162.
[6] Aiken, "The Levels of Moral Discourse," *Ethics*, LXII (July, 1952) 245-7.

made and that the autonomy which, as social beings, we normally grant to moral rules can itself be transcended by the raising of questions which require the whole enterprise of morality to justify itself before some *other* court of appeal. Finally, they forget that 'justification' is a many-sided process and that what, from one point of view, is an adequate justification is, from another standpoint, no more than the posing of a problem "[7]

However, if Toulmin is careful to remain true to his own arguments, he can still reply to such a question as this, although I doubt whether his reply would put an end to the questions of the moral sceptic or "despairing philosopher". His reply runs as follows:

". . . if those who call for a 'justification' want 'the case for morality', as opposed to 'the case for expediency', etc., then they are giving philosophy a job which is not its own. To show that you ought to choose certain actions is one thing; to make you *want to do* what you ought to do is another, and not a philosopher's task." [8]

I am not certain that I understand Toulmin's point here; but if it is to point out the distinction between guiding and goading, between offering a justification for a moral judgement and supplying a motive to make a person behave morally, I agree with Toulmin that, at the level we are now discussing, the distinction between guiding and goading is essential. But I do not think such a distinction will help Toulmin in rejecting the above "post-ethical questions" as absurd. For, in demanding a justification of morality, we are not asking for a motive to behave morally, but are asking a justificatory question about morality as an activity. We want to know (as do Glaucon and Adeimantus) what justifying reasons (if any) there are for taking the moral point of view rather than appraising actions on the basis of whether they will serve our own self-interest.[9] The moral sceptic need *not* be just asking for a motive in asking, 'Is any justification of ethics needed?'[10] He may be asking why he ought (in some non-moral sense of 'ought') to do what he ought (moral sense of 'ought') to do? To think there is something logically absurd in the last question, is to forget that 'ought' has a variety of uses. Forgetting that 'ought' has these multiple

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 246, italics mine.

[8] Toulmin, *The Place of Reason in Ethics*, p. 163.

[9] I am assuming here that ethical egoism is not a possible *ethical* view. I have tried to offer some arguments in support of this contention in my article "Egoism in Ethics". See *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, forthcoming.

[10] I am using 'justification' in the above context in a quite ordinary sense. I am not using it in the extended sense of "pragmatic justification" or "vindication".

functions in different contexts, 'ought' is treated as if it had only one use or meaning. A somewhat different error is arbitrarily to take 'ought' only in its full moral sense and to ignore other uses as illegitimate uses. But if we take the full spectrum of uses of 'ought', 'good', 'right', etc., as our basic *explicandum,* we cannot make the defence Toulmin suggests: that is, we cannot rule out Aiken's *"post-ethical"* question. And, in asking for a 'justification of ethics' these various uses, at different points, all become relevant.

However, it is difficult to make any positive comments about the odd question, 'Is any justification of ethics needed?'. Toulmin has certainly gone a long way toward showing what a queer sort of question it is, even though he has not shown it to be logically absurd. I will try now to point out a couple of contexts in which this admittedly odd question can naturally arise.

B

Let us first take a fictional example from a completely non-philosophical context. Huck Finn's moral crisis (Chapter XVI of *Huckleberry Finn*) arises around his relation with the runaway slave, Jim. Huck Finn is a sensitive youth. Though he is an "outcast", he is deeply, but yet ambivalently, involved in the Southern society of the middle of the last century. He feels that slavery is perfectly justifiable and hates abolitionists. He does not question this part of the moral code of his society at all, at least not consciously. When a steamboat boiler explodes and he is asked if anyone is hurt, he replies, "No'm, killed a nigger", and, of course, finds nothing wrong in the response, "Well, it's lucky, because sometimes people do get hurt."[11] By chance, Huck Finn travels with Jim in his flight to free territory. Huck, as the voyage progresses, begins to suffer pangs of conscience and resolves to turn Jim in; but, at the last moment, he cannot bring himself to do what he regards as unquestionably right and, by a neat trick, helps Jim escape. But Huck feels guilt rather than exaltation in doing this; and it would be a blatant ethnocentrism to assume that Huck, behind the facade of a conventionalized moral code, dimly discerned the true light of "the Natural Moral Law". Huck feels he did wrong and is conscience-stricken; but, he feels that the sanctions of non-moral dictates are simply stronger. He remarks just after he had set the men off Jim's trail:

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[11] Requoted with Lionel Trilling's comment in Lionel Trilling, *The Liberal Imagination* (New York: 1953), p. 114. I might add that my interpretation here of Huck Finn's moral crisis is in a large measure indebted to Trilling.

"They went off and I got aboard the raft, feeling bad and low, because I knowed very well I had done wrong, but I see it warn't no use for me to try to learn to do right; a body that don't get *started* right when he's little ain't got no show—when the pinch comes there ain't nothing to back him up and keep him to his work, and so he gets beat. Then I thought a minute, and says to myself, hold on; s'pose you'd 'a' done right and give Jim up, would you felt better than what you do now? No, says I, I'd feel bad—I'd feel just the same way I do now. Well, then, says I, what's the use of you learning to do right when it's troublesome to do right and ain't no trouble to do wrong, and the wages is just the same? I was stuck. I couldn't answer that. So I reckoned I wouldn't bother no more about it, but after this always do whichever come handiest at the time."[12]

The rationalization here is obvious and so also is the realization by Huck that, in the words of Lionel Trilling, he will never "again be certain that what he considers the clear dictates of moral reason are not merely the engrained customary beliefs of his time and place".[13] Of course, Huck's decision to do "whichever come handiest at the time" could be plausibly read not as a rejection of morality as an activity but only as the inarticulate rejection of a particular morality. If this is indeed the case, I do not have the case I want. On this last interpretation, 'right' and 'wrong' are being used in the passage quoted from *Huckleberry Finn* in a conventional or inverted comma sense. I am not concerned to dispute this interpretation, but only to point out that both psychologically and logically the above passage could be given the interpretation that I have given it.

Let us now look at an odd kind of rejection of the ultimacy of a strictly moral appeal. Crisis theologians (Barth, Tillich *et al.*), following Kierkegaard, give us a lot of vague talk about the "teleological suspension of the ethical".[14] Kierkegaard, in *Fear and Trembling*, discusses with sympathy the biblical episode where Abraham is willing to sacrifice his son Isaac at God's command, though not questioning that his act would be immoral (i.e., not in accord with a moral point of view). Abraham is ready to sacrifice Isaac merely because God commands it. He reasons that our basic loyalty is to God and that God can, if he chooses, suspend the laws of morality. Now, of course, here I am only interested in the logic of the situation and not in the obvious

[12] *Huckleberry Finn*, ch. XVI.
[13] Trilling, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
[14] Soren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling* (Princeton: 1941). Martin Buber, "The Suspension of Ethics", *The Moral Principles of Action*, Anshen ed. (New York: 1952), pp. 223-7.

psychological problems such a "stand" involves. Let us put ourselves in the context of a crisis theologian like Kierkegaard discussing Abraham's act with a rationalist like A. C. Ewing or H. J. Paton (C. T. = crisis theologian ; R = rationalist) :

C. T. : It was Abraham's Absolute Duty to sacrifice Isaac to God.

R. : But how could he know it was the voice of God speaking rather than the commands of the Devil or the promptings of his own *id?*

C. T. : It was directly revealed to him.

R. : But how so? How does he *know* 'it was directly revealed' ?

C. T. : It is self-evident.

R. : Perhaps? But it is less clear to me that this "paradox of faith" is self-evident than that it is self-evidently certain that to sacrifice one's son in this fashion is morally wrong.[15]

C. T. : As a moral truth yes, but the validity of even a certain moral duty can at times be suspended by a higher Duty and Purpose—God's Purpose—the Highest Duty.

R. : But first one must know that God is a just God. We can make no conclusions from Theology until we have the power of moral discernment to intuit what is Good.[16]

C. T. : You're talking like "the Professor". You are only thinking in terms of "moral justice". God prescribes Duties that surpass our understanding—surpass our own weak power of moral discernment.

R. : But that just isn't reasonable or rational !

C. T. : No, of course not, it is a part of the absurdity of faith—the blind leap in the dark of the troubled human heart : the leap of faith that alone will save one from despair. But accepting this absurdity unquestioningly is just what it is to have faith. A "knight of Faith" must just accept this absurd paradox.

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[15] H. J. Paton actually remarks in criticizing Kierkegaard on this point: "If we look at this incident unhistorically, as Kierkegaard does himself, I sympathize with Kant's commonsense attitude—Abraham could not be sure that it was God who told him to kill Isaac, but he could be sure that to do so was wrong." Paton, *In Defence of Reason,* p. 220. See his whole article "Existentialism as an Attitude to Life", in *In Defence of Reason,* pp. 213-28. Note also his remarks about Barth and Kierkegaard in his *The Modern Predicament.*

[16] A. C. Ewing, "Some Meanings of 'Good' and 'Ought' ", *Readings in Ethical Theory,* ed. J. Hospers and W. Sellars, p. 224. The above argument (a paraphrase of Ewing's argument) is the traditional argument accepted (taking into account variants in the idiom), by almost all "secular philosophers", empiricists and rationalists alike, against such an "irrationalist position".

R.: But religion has no monopoly on absurdity. One can take a "leap in the Dark" to National Socialism too, *a la* Heidigger and Scheler.

C. T.: Precisely so! That is the paradox of faith. One can only have faith that one hasn't a false Absolute.[17]

Now, this is indeed an odd argument. I will not deny that it is nonsense of a kind; but it is not logical nonsense. Kierkegaard's "religious talk" (Toulmin's and Pascal's "method of the heart")[18] must be accepted in its own mode of reasoning, although of course it is not empirical talk or even moral talk. Further, it is clear that, in that context, Kierkegaard is rejecting the autonomy and ultimacy of an "ethical appeal" without challenging in the slightest that, in terms of an ethical mode of reasoning, Abraham had the best of reasons for not killing Isaac. Now, whatever we think of this Kierkegaardian argument, we have no right to reject contexts like the above, and contexts like the one about Huck Finn, as unintelligible or logically absurd. We can, however, as logicians, point out their esoteric nature. But it does not deductively follow that because they are esoteric we must grade them down.

The questions "Why should I be moral?" and "Why be moral?" are both meaningful, logically non-absurd questions. We can reason about both of them and we can, with perfect linguistic propriety, ask if the attempts of Plato, and others, to uphold taking a moral point of view are justified. Genuine questions of value—of good and bad—arise around both of these questions, for "Why should I be moral?" is the Gyges-like question an individual might ask when he questions whether he (as an individual) ought always to take a moral point of view. He might answer this in the negative and at the same time assert that there ought to be a morality as a social practice. He is not going to abide by its dictates, but he will seek to make others believe he is a "pillar of the community". That is to say, "Why be moral?", when not functioning as a short-hand phrase for "Why should I be moral?", can function to question the good of the whole activity of morality as a social practice, and this is distinct from the individual's self-questioning about whether he ought to act morally. Someone might say, "There is no reason why I ought to be moral, but there is every good reason in the world why people generally ought to be moral". Glaucon and Adeimantus readily admit that Thrasymachus has been bested

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17 Martin Buber, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-7.
18 See Toulmin, *The Place of Reason in Ethics*, p. 217.

and that morality is a socially useful device; but they want
Socrates to go on and prove to them that the individual ought
to be moral even in the limiting or "desert island" situation in
which he would be perfectly safe in being immoral. "Why should
I be moral?" and "Why be moral?" are clearly distinct in at
least some of their uses. But here my crucial point has been to
indicate that both of these questions are non-absurd questions
requiring evaluative (but not moral) answers.

To sum up, my basic argument has been that there are
contexts in which we can ask meaningfully for a justification of
morals as an activity. Toulmin's analysis has not met that sort
of case, nor do I see how Toulmin can rule out such cases as
irrelevant to morals, even though he has shown they are not
moral questions. The determined philosophical, moral sceptic
either has something like the above considerations in mind or,
because of the non-descriptive functions of evaluative terms, is
unwittingly asking for justification where there can be no literal
justification. In any event, an adequate meta-ethical theory must
account for either situation.

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FREE WILL: PROBLEM OR PSEUDO-PROBLEM?

By R. D. Bradley

Since, for centuries, professional philosophers and theologians, as well as intelligent laymen, have debated the question "Are we really free?" without success, it is not surprising that some of them have been less perplexed by the original question than by the derivative one "Why has it not been conclusively answered?"; and the answer to this question, I wish to argue, is that the first simply does not permit of a straightforward "Yes" or "No" reply. As with all the other perennial philosophical questions—'perennial' just because no one has answered them decisively—the real difficulty with the free-will question is not to discover its answer but to discern its possible senses.

It is clear that when a moral philosopher asks whether we are really free he is not thinking of any of the kinds of freedom that we variously distinguish as political freedom, economic freedom, academic freedom, religious freedom, and the like. The freedom that concerns him is *moral* freedom—that is, the freedom which is generally acknowledged to be a necessary condition of morality. But what is moral freedom, and what is it freedom from?

In our everyday dealings with other people we regard it as a sort of moral axiom that a person may justly be praised, censured or punished only if he is responsible and so, in some sense, "free". The ordinary man, of course, does not doubt that we are, as a rule, free in the sense required by ethics, and if we were to question this he would remind us that we do in actual fact hold people praise- and blame-worthy for their actions so far as they are not forced to do them, either by circumstances or by other people. When a person is free from such specifiable constraints and compulsions the ordinary man regards him as morally free. But some philosophers do not: and they betray their dissatisfaction with the commonsense criteria of moral freedom by persisting in asking whether anyone is ever *really* free. The criterion that they urge upon us is "freedom-from-determination", and it is not hard to see what led them to it. What worries them is the apparent contradiction between saying both that a man is free and that all events (including our actions) are determined by preceding causes. It seems to them that if all

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our actions are causally determined there is no point in saying that we are "free" by commonsense criteria, for we are not *really* free. Without freedom-from-determination, they conclude, no one can ever be really free in the sense demanded by ethics. Thus the free-will theory was devised largely as an attempt to save ethics and the "freedom" on which it supposedly depends from the apparent onslaught of determinism. Determinists tells us, among other things, that all events are completely determined by causal laws. The libertarian philosopher, however, while he may (perhaps) grant that events in the *physical* world are so determined—he may, indeed, admit this even of much human behaviour—contends that at least some *mental* acts, namely acts of volition, are exempt from causal determination: he hopes, in effect, to escape the net of determinism by postulating a new *sort* of event which he calls "an act of free will". Hence, as he commonly asks it, the free-will question is, "Are our *wills* free from determination?".

Now the reason why we must resist the temptation to give a straightforward answer to the free-will question is this: it is primarily not a question about what the facts are but rather about what we are to say of the facts. Another way of making much the same point is to say that the free-will dispute arises out of confusions about what certain words mean, or (what is the same thing) about what their implications are. This is why so many philosophers have avoided answering the free-will question directly and have sought instead to reconcile the disputants; they have tried to show, for example, that "Determination and the faith in freedom meet and are united in the facts and . . . . the long enmity has been a bad dream".[1]

Hume was, I think, the first to argue explicitly that there is a *prima facie* case against saying that the dispute is simply about what the facts of the case are: "From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression, and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy".[2] He put it rather more contentiously when he wrote: "it will not require many words to prove that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal".[3]   Other

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[1] R. E. Hobart: "Free will as involving Determination and inconceivable without it". (*Mind*, 1934).
[2] *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed.), Sect. viii, Part 1, p. 80, § 62.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 95, § 73.

philosophers too have held that the free-will controversy arises out of confusion, but it was Hume's merit to have told us what *sort* of confusion it was, viz., a verbal one.

Now the point that Hume made about the nature of the free-will dispute has more recently been made about *all* philosophical disputes. The logical positivists, under the spell of empiricism and the sort of questions which scientists ask (*and answer*), contended that philosophical questions, so far as they can be distinguished from scientific ones, do not pose problems to be solved but *pseudo*-problems to be *dis*-solved. In spite of its deprecatory tone this remark has proved both salutary and sound, for it marked clearly the boundary between empirical or scientific questions on the one hand, and philosophical questions on the other, and thus safeguarded philosophy from the threatening inroads of science. So long as philosophers considered their task to be essentially the same as the scientists', viz., to obtain factual information (only of a more general kind), they were open to the charge that, since the methods they employed had not met with conspicuous success, they should hand over to the scientists, whose empirical methods of observation and experiment had. Indeed a series of successful prosecutions for trespassing threatened to leave the philosopher with no territory of his own. The legitimacy of a separate sort of enquiry, employing methods different from those of the sciences, was guaranteed only when it was clearly understood that philosophical questions are not empirical ones and so must not be answered as if they were. Certainly, many philosophers in the past had recognised that while some of the questions that interested them could be settled by appealing to established facts or discovering new ones, others could be settled only by coming to understand the meanings of the words involved and thereby reconciling the disputants: but it is contended by many contemporary philosophers that *qua* philosophers their interest is solely with the latter sort of question, and so they view themselves neither as conducting their own empirical investigations, nor even as correlating the findings of other people's empirical investigations, but rather as "clarifying our concepts" and thereby "resolving our philosophical perplexities".

The free-will question, it seems, is a philosophical one *par excellence*. There are, of course, many questions whose grammatical form provides the model for the required answer: "Are whales mammals?—whales are mammals"; we need only make a simple change from the interrogative to the indicative mood. But this is characteristic only of those questions that we can

answer simply by adducing evidence (either about facts we have discovered or about the established use or definition of the words involved) which, it is agreed, will settle the issue in this way or that. "Are tigers carnivorous?" A person asking this question would normally agree that the answer is to be found by such means as consulting books on natural history, observing the eating habits of tigers, and so on. But he can proceed in this sort of way only because there is agreement as to what it would be like (or what would have to be the case) for a creature to be a carnivore. Again, if someone were to ask "Is this limestone formation a stalagmite?" we might appropriately recommend him to consult his guide-book, to look up the dictionary, and so on, and his question can be answered by a simple "Yes" or "No" simply because there is agreement as to what it means for a formation to be called a "stalagmite". But the free-will question, although of similar grammatical form, is in an important respect like neither of these questions. Since there is no general agreement as to what facts, if any, would *count* towards settling the question "Has man a free will?" or even what it *means* to talk about a "free will", the question is strictly unanswerable. This is why we must resist the temptation to give a straightforward affirmative or negative answer and instead begin with the counter-move: "It all depends on what you question means". What is called for is not a factual enquiry but a logical enquiry, not an answer but an elucidation.

There is, then, an important difference between empirical and philosophical questions, that is to say, between questions which ask for information and are satisfied when it is provided, and questions which, although they look like requests for information, can never be satisfied in this way. This difference, I have said, has been effectively signalised by the distinction between "genuine" and "pseudo" problems respectively. It follows that *when philosophers dispute among themselves as to whether the free will question is a "real" or "pseudo" one, what is really at issue is whether or not they think any actual or conceivable empirical evidence would settle it decisively.*

Thus, in recent years, contributors to the free-will controversy have tended more and more to range themselves into two opposing groups. On the one hand, there are those to whom the question "Are our wills really free?" presents a pseudo-problem, a conflict that can be resolved only by a special kind of arbitration—variously called "linguistic analysis", "conceptual enquiry", and other such things, while on the other hand, there are those who are convinced that verbal enquiries are necessarily

trivial and that what we need is simply more facts—facts about the world and facts about human beings. Thus the answer to the free-will question has sometimes been identified with the answers to such questions as "Has the determinist principle of classical physics been abandoned by the new quantum mechanics?" and "Are human actions completely predictable?". There are, for instance, a good many philosophers who incline towards the position of C. S. Peirce, who wrote:[4] "by supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how little— be it by a strictly infinitesimal amount—we gain room to insert mind [and therefore free will also] into our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is needed, into the position which, as the sole self-intelligible thing, it is entitled to occupy, that of the fountain of existence". Others, like Maurice Cranston, contend that "the traditional problem can be reformulated without loss of meaning into the words: 'Are all human actions and choices predictable?' ".[5] Of these and other similar attempts to identify the free-will question with specific empirical questions, it need only be said in reply that they are *not* identical questions. We might know the answer to these empirical questions and yet still want to know whether we have freedom of will. There is no contradiction involved in asserting that Heisenberg's so-called "principle of indeterminacy" governs the sub-atomic physical world and that we do not have free will. When Schrödinger, for example, contends that "quantum physics has nothing to do with the free-will problem"[6] he might conceivably be wrong but he certainly is not contradicting himself. Neither is there a contradiction in saying that human choices and actions are completely predictable and that free will is not illusory. Thus Kant was able to write:[7] "if it were possible to have so profound an insight into a man's mental character as shown by internal as well as external actions, as to know all its motives, even the smallest, and likewise all the external occasions that can influence them, we could calculate a man's conduct for the future with as great certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse; and nevertheless we may maintain that the man is free". Clearly, then, it cannot simply be taken for granted that the free-will question is identical with or reducible to one or other of these (or other similar) empirical questions: it would need to be shown what the logical connections are between the two questions and this would be to abandon

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[4] "Doctrine of Necessity Examined" (*Collected Papers*, pp. 42-43).
[5] *Freedom: A New Analysis*, p. 132. (See also P. Herbst, "Freedom and Prediction", *Mind*, 1957, p. 1.)
[6] *Science and Humanism*, p. 67.
[7] *Critique of Practical Reason*, (trans. Abbott), p. 193.

what was held to be a purely empirical enquiry and engage instead in a logical or philosophical enquiry. Again, we might ask what would happen if physicists were to re-establish strict predictability as the basis of particle-physics? Would this force Eddington, Peirce or Cranston, for example, to give up their belief in human freedom? Like Susan Stebbing, I am tempted to reply: "Assuredly not. How then can the results of the work of physicists have any bearing upon this intuition?"[8]

But not all attempts to treat the problem as if it were an empirical one can be dismissed as summarily as these. Indeed the theory we are now to consider is part of a deeply rooted and long established tradition concerning the way in which certain philosophical questions are to be approached, and it therefore deserves our serious and detailed attention. The theory is that there are two worlds and two corresponding ways of knowing: an outer physical world whose contents are apprehended by sensory observation, and an inner mental world whose contents can be scrutinised by "inner" perception or introspection. It holds, further, that the free-will question, like most of those that puzzle philosophers, is primarily a question about human psychology, i.e., about the states and operations of our own minds. Accordingly, the free-will question is treated as if it were capable of solution by an *empirical* method—not, indeed, by sensory observation and experiment, but by non-sensory observation and experiment.

Professor C. A. Campbell, who is one of the ablest defenders of both libertarianism and the view that free will is not a pseudo-problem, is convinced not only that the free-will question can be answered, but that it has been answered, and that its answer is given by the introspective method. In this he is in sympathy with a long line of libertarians from Dr. Samuel Johnson, whose pronouncement on the subject is well-known: "Sir, we *know* the will is free, and there's an end on't", to R. B. Braithwaite, who concluded his contribution to an Aristotelian Society symposium with: "As for the pure philosophical 'freedom of the will' my will is as free as I feel it to be and there is an end of the matter."[9] The fact that our wills are free in a contra-causal sense, Campbell contends, can be discovered provided only that we set about looking for it in the appropriate manner, i.e. by internal self-examination rather than by external conduct-observation. All we need to do is to attend honestly to the deliverances of our practical consciousness and we

[8] *Philosophy and the Physicists*, p. 218 (Pelican ed., p. 165).
[9] *Proc. Arist. Soc., supp. vol.* x, p. 138.

will *know* forthwith that our wills are really free. In Chapters IV and V of his *Scepticism and Construction*[10] he presents an outline of his views regarding the free-will theory. His thesis there is that "intellectual incorrigibility attaches to the belief in personal freedom[11] and that this freedom has a warrant that is "infallible, not a questionable hypothesis, but a self-complete datum".[12] Personal freedom is contra-causal and its warrant is the "immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action".[13] He argues that from the standpoint of an external observer it could never be shown that man has the power to interrupt the causal order, as any break could always be attributed to ignorance; hence such contra-causal freedom can be known only through the subject's own immediate experience of himself as acting. If we inwardly scrutinise an "effortful act of will", he concludes, we will know with indefeasible certitude that we possess such freedom.

These arguments recur in his *Mind* (1951) article "Is Free Will a Pseudo-Problem?" and are elaborated more recently still in his contribution to the third series of *Contemporary British Philosophy*.[14] There, in a paper entitled "Self-Activity and its Modes", he argues that the two *creative* modes of self-activity, moral-decision activity and moral-effort activity, can be shown to involve causal discontinuity. He requests the reader simply to conduct an introspective experiment, viz., to approach an experience of moral temptation and the rival ends that it presents "from the inside, from the standpoint of the agent *qua* acting",[15] and he confidently predicts what the result of this self-interrogation will be: "Here the self is revealed to itself as a being capable of *transcending* its own 'formed character', a being with a power, so far as these respects of its conduct are concerned, of absolute self-origination".[16] It is necessary only for a person to "describe" what he seems to find in and before his mind in the required "experimental situation".[17] The facts are there to be found: we have only to look for them in the appropriate way and report what we find. He sincerely believes that his own introspective reports will hold good for anyone who "introspects carefully and without preconceptions",[18] in spite of the obvious

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[10] (Allen and Unwin, 1931).
[11] P. 108.
[12] P. 111.
[13] P. 113. (Quoted from Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, 6th ed., p. 65.)
[14] Ed. H. D. Lewis (Allen and Unwin, 1956).
[15] P. 110.
[16] P. 114.
[17] P. 114.
[18] P. 115.

precariousness of this assumption. The vindication of the introspective method is simply this: it is the only available means of apprehension. To look for the meaning of free-will from the external standpoint is to look for it in a way that ensures that it will not be found. "Either we study activity through the medium of introspection, or we resign ourselves to not studying it at all."[19] Thus, Campbell's counsel to anyone asking the free-will question would be something like this: "Turn your mind's eye inwards and scrutinise the contents of your practical consciousness at the moment of making a moral effort or moral decision. There, and there only, will you find your answer. And you need never doubt what you have found, for, unlike evidence obtained through sensory observation and experiment, the deliverances of this introspective observation and experiment are infallibly veridical."

Now, if Campbell is right, further discussion and argument about the free-will problem will clearly be pointless. We should at this stage retire to a quiet room and repeat these introspective experiments for ourselves, confidently expecting that we shall soon emerge with the answer! Thereafter we need do nothing more than advertise the fact to those unenlightened philosophers who are still wading through their long and tedious logical enquiries about the concepts of "freedom", "responsibility", "determinism", "causation", "character", "volition" and the like. But can the dispute be settled in this way? I shall argue that, for the following reasons, it can not.

(1) The credentials of the introspective method are suspect, in the first place, because there still occur disputes—the free-will controversy is one of them—which, according to the theory, should long ago have been finally solved. This is especially hard to understand, since inner perception is supposed to follow the model of sensory perception with this difference only, that the former gives us direct and infallible knowledge of its objects, whereas with the latter we have to be content with information that is indirect and therefore fallible. But what are we to say when the reports of two introspective experimenters conflict, as do, for example, those of Professors Campbell and Maclagan? Both believe in the efficacy of the introspective method, but whereas Campbell reports that our sense of effort in making a difficult moral choice reveals freedom to us, Maclagan denies this and reports rather that he has no intuition of freedom independent of the fact of duty: according to him, what is

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[19] P. 115.

affirmed by practical consciousness is duty-and-freedom "given" as an undivided, though complex, fact.[20]

Now when we are faced with an ordinary empirical dispute arising out of different observational reports, we usually know how to settle the dispute, for it may be simply that we did not observe carefully enough or take all the necessary steps to exclude possible error. But, faced with a dispute about the findings of introspection, what steps should be taken to rectify our mistakes? What would it mean, in such a case, to tell the experimenters to introspect "more carefully"? What precautions would they need to take and against what? There seems to be nothing even remotely resembling the elaborate system of checks and precautions that the laboratory experimenter demands for the successful conduct of his experiments. Nor is it possible, in this sort of case, to call in a third party to review, check, or repeat the experiment, for clearly no one can either verify or falsify the private introspected findings of another.

The occurrence of a conflict when conflict is supposed to be impossible might, of course, be explained by saying that introspective experiments lend themselves more readily than their sensory counterparts to distortion by our preconceived notions. This is what Campbell has in mind when he warns us that other people's introspected findings will tally with his only if they conduct their experiments "without preconceptions", and he implies that, provided we do exercise due care and guard against the influence of our preconceptions, the introspective method will prove infallible. Now in ordinary scientific investigations we do not make our observations with completely blank minds: on the contrary, we approach the world with a hypothesis of some sort, whether it is vague or explicit, in mind. In a sense, then, preconceptions are virtually unavoidable and even an essential part of our empirical enquiries. It is clear, of course, that the important question is not whether we have preconceptions but only whether we have allowed them to distort our findings. Now in ordinary scientific investigations this is not too hard to determine, for the scientist's experiments may be checked or even duplicated by others and his findings accordingly either corroborated or not. But how can this be done when the experiment is a purely private introspective one? What precautions would we need to take against the illegal operation of our preconceptions and how would we know whether they had been effective? A faculty of immediate supposedly 'veridical'

[20] *Proc. Arist. Soc., supp. vol.* **xxv**, pp. 193-199.

perception loses its special efficacy if we cannot even be sure that the necessary conditions for its successful operation have been fulfilled. Indeed 'inner' perception seems to suffer from all the defects of ordinary perception plus some of its own, and is certainly no less fallible in principle.

(2) Campbell regards the introspective method as specially suited to the task of demonstrating that our wills are "free" in a contra-causal sense. His thesis, it will be remembered, is that against all argument it *can be shown* that man has the power to (and often does) interrupt the causal order. He argues that by external observation of a man's conduct no such interruption can be established as, even if it does in fact occur, it can always be attributed to ignorance or mere carelessness in observation : such an interruption can, he concludes, be demonstrated only through the subject's own immediate experience of himself in acting. But this argument will not do, for propositions like "There is no cause for this event" are not capable of conclusive verification by *any* kind of observation, whether external or internal. We may, under certain conditions, be able to observe X, but we can never be completely sure that we have observed non-X : it is always possible that we have instead merely *not*-observed X. Thus, absence of an experience of causality is far from being the same as experience of an absence of causality. The point is that observation of any kind is, by the nature of the case, incapable of establishing negative existential propositions of this kind. It is true, as Campbell recognises, that an external observer can never demonstrate that a break in the causal chain has taken place, but it is also true, as he does not realise, that an internal observer could not demonstrate it either. And for precisely the same reason : for it is always possible, even in the case of introspection, to attribute the apparent break in the causal sequence to the inaccuracy of our inner observations or our mere ignorance of all the relevant factors.

(3) Campbell contends that we can *know* that such propositions as "My will is contra-causally free", "I could (in a categorical sense of 'could') have chosen otherwise", and "The self has a power of absolute spontaneity or self-origination", are true, if we look for them in the right place and by the right means, i.e. if we examine the contents of our own consciousness by means of inner perception. I shall now argue that this cannot be the case, firstly because the data of introspection do not in fact include *any* propositions, and, secondly, because such propositions cannot even be said to *report* such data, let alone report them correctly.

What Campbell wishes to establish is not merely that we have *feelings* of "being free" and "absolute spontaneity" etc., for such subjective feelings are notoriously untrustworthy and far from being incorrigible: on the contrary, he hopes to show that we have indubitable *knowledge* of such propositions as "My will is contra-causally free" and the rest. That is, he thinks of himself, not as telling us something about his own mind, but rather as telling us something which is capable of being objectively true or false. But what is true or false is always a proposition, not an object, event, feeling, perception, mental state, or other sort of datum. Not only is perception different from knowledge, but their objects too are different. The things we feel and perceive are denoted by nouns and noun-phrases: only of the things we know, i.e. propositions, can truth or falsity be predicated. *That* I have a feeling of freedom may be true or false, but *what* I feel, since it is not itself a proposition, cannot be either. Thus, not only does it not make sense to talk of propositions as possible data of inner perception, but the deliverances of this inner perception cannot be "infallibly veridical", since neither truth nor falsity can sensibly be predicated of them.

But although the question cannot arise whether the data of 'inner perception' are true or false, the question whether the reports we give of them are true or false can. Might it not be argued, then, that the libertarian's propositions are correct *interpretations* of what we feel when we make a deliberate moral effort or choice?

The problem we are to examine is this: there certainly are occasions when we may quite properly say "I feel free", "I feel that I could have done otherwise", and "I feel a sense of agency"; but is it ever proper to say what the libertarian wants to say, viz. "I feel *contra-causally free*", "I feel I *could (categorically) have done otherwise*", and "I feel *absolute spontaneity*"?

Let us first be clear as to what it is that we are supposed to "feel" in these cases. Now, although it is often idiomatically correct to say "I feel free", "I feel I could have done otherwise", and "I feel a sense of agency", strictly speaking none of these avowals reports the occurrence of an internal feeling. Unlike certain other accusatives of the verb "to feel", e.g. "a pain", "an itch", etc. the expressions "free", "could have done otherwise", "sense of agency", are not the names of special internal sensations; rather do they indicate the possession of some capacity or other. This is shown by the fact that we are usually quite indifferent as to whether, for instance, we say "I feel free" or alternatively "I *am* free". Thus a person might equally well say

either of these things if he had recently been discharged from the army, gone on holiday, or conquered an enslaving habit; and in each case he would be telling us that he is now able to exercise a capacity in circumstances where he had previously been under pressure or constraint of some sort. These are the criteria for the correct use of both the expression "I feel free" and the expression "I am free". We learn to use these expressions correctly by observing the sorts of circumstances in which other people say of us "He is free" and "He feels free", and since their criteria for ascribing freedom to me cannot possibly include the fact that I have experienced a peculiar internal sensation labelled "feeling of freedom", my own criteria (if I am speaking correctly) will not include it either. Thus, what guarantees my right to say "I *feel* free" is what also guarantees my right, in the same circumstances, to say "I *am* free" (and the right of other people to say *"He* is free"), viz. my capacity to perform or not to perform certain actions. In other words, I can correctly say "I feel free" if and only if my criteria for ascribing freedom to myself are the same as the public criteria employed by other people in ascribing it to me. And the same, I suggest, is true also of the expressions "could have done otherwise" (past experience shows that I had the ability to do X instead of Y and neither circumstances nor other people forced me to do Y) and "have a feeling of agency" (I, and nobody else, did Y, or Y was my action). That is to say, since their special function is to report the possession of an ability or capacity to act or abstain from acting in a certain way, none of these expressions can strictly be said to report a mental event, feeling, occurrence, sensation, or datum of any kind. Rather than say that we *feel* free, etc., at the moment of making a moral decision or choice, we might more appropriately say that we *know* that we are free, i.e. we know certain facts about the circumstances in which we made the choice, e.g. that we were not acting under duress of any kind, that if circumstances had been different we would have chosen differently, and so on.

Now the question that really concerns us is whether we are ever entitled to report that we are contra-causally free, that *everything else being exactly the same* we "could" have chosen to do otherwise, or that we have a power of *absolute spontaneity* or *self-origination?* In the first place, it is pretty clear that these expressions do not, any more than their everyday non-libertarian counterparts, name anything simple that we could conceivably be said to "feel" or "sense". Indeed, the libertarian avowedly intends them to convey a whole complex philosophical theory about the

world. But do they convey anything at all? Ordinarily, for instance, we do not talk about being "contra-causally free" but only about being "free" and it is hard to see that the libertarian can mean when he says he is (or feels) "contra-causally free" any more than the rest of us mean when, in exactly the same circumstances, we say simply that we are (or feel) "free". Since, on his own admission, there are no ordinary (public) criteria for the use of this expression—to look for a breach of causal continuity from the external standpoint, Campbell tells us, is to "blindfold ourselves and then complain that we cannot see"—we are forced to conclude that if the expression has any use at all, it can only be a purely private and esoteric one. To the ordinary person, it conveys nothing more than, for example, does the phrase "contra-causally happy", that is, nothing at all. Again, we have seen that there is a perfectly good use for the expression "I could have done otherwise". It is, however, a use which is geared to certain publicly ascertainable criteria—facts about my ability and the circumstances in which I acted. "Can" and "could have" statements are ordinarily to be understood as hypotheticals, i.e. as capable of being expressed by "will . . . if . . ." and "would . . . if . . ."statements respectively. The libertarian, however, wants to interpret such statements, whenever they occur in moral contexts, categorically and unconditionally, i.e. as if the mere possession of an ability were the sufficient condition for its exercise. But what does this mean? Surely there is something logically very odd in the notion of an unconditional capacity—if (by hypothesis) there was nothing preventing its exercise, why was it not exercised? Since the libertarian has departed from the ordinary criteria for the use of the expression "could have done otherwise", we are uncertain what he wants us to understand by it. He may, if he likes, continue to describe the situation as he does, but he cannot expect us to regard his description as a correct one. And, similarly, when he tells us that his choice exhibits the self's power of absolute spontaneity, we will, so far as we understand him at all, suppose him to mean simply that he is aware that he (and not someone else) made the choice or did the action.

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DISCUSSION

FREE WILL: A REPLY TO MR. R. D. BRADLEY

By C. A. CAMPBELL

Let me at least begin on a note of accord. I heartily endorse Mr. Bradley's insistence upon the need for a logical enquiry into the meanings of 'freedom' which will aim at elucidating what sort of freedom it is that is at issue in the free-will problem. I am only a little puzzled that he should tend to suggest that the need for such an enquiry is appreciated exclusively by linguistic philosophers. I am also entirely at one with him in believing that a first step towards the required elucidation is to recognise that the kind of freedom that here matters is "the freedom which is generally acknowledged to be a necessary condition of morality".

But with this, I am afraid, agreement virtually ends. Almost immediately it becomes apparent that, for Bradley, the logical enquiry is not just an indispensable preliminary, but *the whole story*. One would naturally suppose that when, as a result of his logical enquiry, a philosopher has reached a decision about what should be meant by 'free will', he would then proceed to seek an answer to the question "Does man *have* free will in this sense?" But not so for Bradley. This question, he tells us, is 'strictly unanswerable'. Unfortunately he does not succeed in making very clear (to me at least) the grounds upon which he bases so drastic an opinion.

What, for example, are we to make of this argument, which is the nearest I can find to a direct argument for his view?

"Since there is no general agreement as to what facts, if any, would *count* towards settling the question 'Has man a free will?' or even what it *means* to talk about a 'free will', the question is strictly unanswerable."

Of course there is no 'general agreement', *prior to the* 'logical enquiry'. But surely the whole point of that enquiry is to determine "what it *means* to talk about a 'free will'?" And if agreement should be secured about this (why, in principle, should it not be?), there is no obstacle in principle that I can see to agreement about "what facts, if any, would *count* towards settling the question 'Has man a free will?'"[1]

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[1] I assume, because nothing else seems to me to make sense, that Bradley means 'general agreement among *philosophers*'. But his concluding pages contain some grounds for misgiving.

Perhaps, however, Bradley is of the opinion that what he has to say about the irrelevance of 'empirical facts' to an answer to the free-will question is sufficient to show that the question is unanswerable? But how *can* it be sufficient?—even if one grants the large assumption that no non-empirical considerations are relevant. How can Bradley possibly know whether empirical facts are relevant or not in advance of an answer to the question to which the 'logical enquiry' is supposed to be directed, the question what a 'free will' is to be taken as *meaning?* For my own part, in the meaning of 'free will' which analysis of the conditions of moral responsibility seems to me to show to be its proper meaning for the free-will controversy, I have no doubt at all that empirical facts are extremely relevant to answering the question "Has man a free will?" And by 'empirical facts' here I do *not* refer only to those on the 'subjective' side disclosed by introspection. Indeed, I find it difficult to understand how, save on a somewhat bizarre conception of free will (like that of Kant, whom Bradley shrewdly quotes), anyone can doubt that the free-will problem is vitally affected by such objectively empirical considerations as the success or failure of physicists "to re-establish strict predictability as the basis of particle-physics".

I suspect that the real source of Bradley's confidence in the 'unanswerability' of the free-will question lies, not in any grounds he offers here, but in his belief that David Hume has shown once and for all that the question is at bottom a mere dispute about words. "Other philosophers too have held that the free-will controversy arises out of confusion, but it was Hume's merit to have told us what *sort* of confusion it was, viz. a verbal one." I could have much wished that Bradley, instead of being content to applaud Hume, had stopped to show us that Hume's argument is a good one. For the argument, in my opinion, is very seriously defective. Perhaps I shall not be going beyond my brief if I say a little about it here myself—especially as I shall thereby be paving the way conveniently for some of the things I want to say in answer to Bradley's specific criticisms of my own views.

I must, of course, severely compress Hume's argument; but this need not, I think, entail the omission of anything essential.

The core of the argument lies in what Hume says about the word 'liberty'. The only meaning of the word which makes sense, he tells us, is that which opposes liberty to *constraint*. "Liberty is *a power of acting, or not acting, according to the determinations of the will.*"[2] Now everyone agrees, he goes on,

[2] *Enquiries*, p. 95. (Selby-Bigge's edition).

that this power is one which a man has or has not according to
his particular physical circumstances. "Here, then, is no subject
of dispute."[3]   To that extent, therefore, every man, be he
libertarian or determinist, holds 'the doctrine of liberty'. Both
libertarian and determinist, however, have deluded themselves
into supposing that they can attach a *further* meaning to 'liberty';
a meaning which it cannot possibly bear and which, if they gave
proper heed to the definition of their terms, both parties would
at once see to be nonsensical and would at once abandon. In
this meaning 'liberty' is opposed not to 'constraint' but to
'necessity'; and the libertarian holds that man has, the determinist
that he has not, a liberty of this kind. But it is perfectly obvious
on reflection, Hume thinks, that what is opposed to *necessity* is,
and is only, *the absence of causes*—in other words, mere *chance*.
Hence "liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is
the same thing with chance: which is universally allowed to have
no existence."[4] It follows that the libertarian, if he paused for
a moment to get clear about his central concept, would be bound
to acknowledge that the only 'doctrine of liberty' that makes
sense is one that is wholly compatible with the 'doctrine of
necessity'. And indeed in ordinary life, where he is less subject
to verbal befuddlement than in philosophy, the libertarian himself
implicitly accepts the 'doctrine of necessity'. For there he
reveals that he shares fully the universal assumption which
underlies men's deeds and words alike in relation to their fellow-
men, the assumption that what a man chooses in any given
circumstances is determined by the specific dispositions which
make up his 'character'—his "ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity,
friendship, generosity, public spirit";[5] an assumption, Hume
goes on, amply justified by the facts, for actual instances of
successful prediction of conduct from character are legion.

To sum up. Both libertarians and determinists accept 'the
doctrine of necessity' and, in the only sense of 'liberty' that is
not obvious nonsense, they both accept 'the doctrine of liberty'
also. Their age-old dispute arises not from any difference of
opinion about facts but simply from a careless use of words, a
'verbal confusion'.

This argument seems to me invalid on at least two cardinal
points.

First, with regard to the alleged agreement on 'the doctrine
of necessity'. It is of course true that we all take for granted a

[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 96.
[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

very large measure of causal continuity between character and conduct. But the amount we take for granted is entirely compatible with acceptance of a small but highly significant measure of causal *dis*continuity. Suppose, for example, that (as on my own view) free will is taken to have as its sole sphere of effective operation the situation of moral temptation; i.e. the situation where there is a felt conflict between that which 'duty' ordains and that to which 'strongest desire' inclines, and where it at least seems to the agent that he has a moral decision to make between genuinely open possibilities. (I take free will to be operative here *only*, because only here can there be any *point* in a man's deliberately deviating from the path of conduct to which his strongest desire—which is simply the manifestation *ad hoc* of his character as so far formed—inclines him.) Now since situations of moral temptation constitute but a minute fraction of human choice-situations, it is obvious that a libertarianism so conceived can accept the possibility of prediction of conduct from character over an enormous range of choice-situations, at the same time as it insists upon the interruption of causal continuity in a small, specified section. Moreover, even in respect of that small section (as I have tried to show elsewhere), a libertarianism of this kind is consistent with a *measure* of prediction.[6] Is any *wider* area of predictability than this indicated by the empirical facts of successful prediction? I see not the faintest reason to suppose that it is.

It seems to me, therefore, that Hume has no right to infer from the confidence which men show in predicting conduct to the assumption by them of unbroken causal continuity between character and conduct—no right to infer that all men 'really' accept 'the doctrine of necessity'. The assumption is not logically required to justify the confidence; and it is most certainly not universally made.

In the second place, Hume's analysis of 'liberty' is conducted on an indefensibly narrow basis. His claim is that a man has only to reflect to see that a liberty which is opposed to necessity has no meaning. I venture the counter-claim that a man has only to introspect to see that it *has meaning*. Hume has gone astray, I submit, because he has neglected to take seriously, and to analyse the nature of, the belief in 'liberty' which a man has *when actually engaged in such experiences as making a moral decision in the situation of 'moral temptation'* (as described above). In order to analyse this belief we must, whether we like

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[6] *On Selfhood and Godhood* (1957), pp. 173-4; also *Scepticism and Construction* (1931), pp. 162-5.

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it or not, have resort to introspection; and I must here assume that the reader's good sense has been proof against what seems to me the wild exaggeration of the difficulties and dangers of the introspective method characteristic of some contemporary philosophers, and that he will not demur at testing the analysis I offer in the only way in which it can be tested. I invite him therefore, if he will be so far compliant, to imagine a situation of moral temptation, and then to ask himself whether, as engaged in that situation, he can *help* believing (a) that his moral decision is *not* necessitated by his character as so far formed (how *could* it be, when the very essence of the decision is, for the agent, whether or not to *oppose* his character as so far formed, in its manifestation as 'strongest desire'?) ; and (b) that his decision is nevertheless not just 'uncaused'—a mere 'chance' phenomenon— but is a decision which *he* makes and for which *he* is responsible.

My own finding is that, as engaged in the situation, I cannot help believing both (a) and (b). And since (a) and (b) conjointly involve a liberty which is opposed both to necessity and to chance, it is for me impossible to accept Hume's view that a liberty of this kind is without meaning. (At the same time I can well understand how it not only can but must seem without meaning to anyone who declines to place himself at the standpoint of a moral agent.)

"Yes", perhaps it will be retorted, "*you* may find this. But what reason have you to be confident that *others* will?" Obviously this raises the whole question of the status of introspection, which needs a paper to itself. I can do no more here than list summarily a few of the considerations that weigh with me in the present case.[7]

(1) I accept the common assumption that there is structural identity in different minds, making possible many forms of experience common to the race. If so, introspective findings concerning these forms should be publicly testable. Everything points to the experience of moral temptation as one such form.

(2) The said experience, in addition to being one which everyone readily recognises, can very easily, and as often as desired, be revived in imagination and attention fixed upon it.

(3) The specific features of it which are of importance in the present connection seem to me of sufficient prominence to be not easily missed once attention is directed to the possibility of their presence.

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[7] The reader might possibly be interested in the wider discussion in *On Selfhood and Godhood*, pp. 110-117.

(4) I have trustworthy evidence that my findings are confirmed by many others who seriously attempt the required experiment.

(5) Critics of my findings seldom, so far as I can discover, introspect and produce different reports.[8] They just decline to introspect at all.

But suppose that I, and those who think with me, are mistaken in our introspective findings. It still will not follow (to resume our main thread) that Hume is justified in holding that the free-will controversy arises from mere 'verbal' confusion. For it has become clear, I hope, that the question whether there is a meaningful sense of 'liberty' in which liberty is opposed to necessity and chance alike is not a *verbal* question. My affirmative answer to the question may be occasioned by a *misreading* of the facts of moral experience. But even so, it is a misreading of the *facts,* and it can only be rebutted by a better reading of the facts. Those who dub this a mere 'verbal' dispute may well be invited to consider whether they are not themselves victims of a verbal confusion about the word 'verbal'.

I conclude, therefore, that Hume's argument cannot be sustained. The free-will problem has arisen for most people, I suggest, in a perfectly natural, simple, and logically impeccable way. Moral experience leads them not merely to attach meaning to, but to believe in their possession of, a liberty opposed alike to necessity and to chance. A variety of other, non-moral considerations powerfully suggest to them that the rule of necessity is *universal.* Not being prepared to rule out of court *a priori* any of the *prima facie* sources of evidence, they understandably suppose themselves to be confronted with a *problem*— "Has man actually *got* the free will which in certain experiences he *believes* that he has?".

I turn now to Bradley's criticisms of my own position.

My reply can be tolerably brief. For on account of one basic misunderstanding, Bradley — despite his manifest fairmindedness—has comprehensively misrepresented my arguments. I find a great deal of what he has to say admirable in itself, but quite irrelevant to anything I have ever held.

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[8] Bradley has very properly drawn attention to a seeming conflict between my introspective finding and that of my colleague Professor Maclagan. I think, however, and I have Maclagan's assurance that he agrees, that any difference that remains between us is one of emphasis rather than of substance. The experience of moral *temptation* and *effort* (stressed by me) and the experience of moral *demand* (which Maclagan stresses) can of course be distinguished; but perhaps only as aspects of a single whole.

The misunderstanding concerns the part which I conceive introspection to play in supporting the libertarian doctrine. I do *not* hold, as Bradley thinks, that by introspection we can become aware of 'contra-causal' freedom (as it were) 'in action'. What I *do* hold is that by introspection we can become aware of an *experience* in which a *belief* in 'contra-causal' freedom is an intrinsic element. On the former of these views, introspection, in so far as veridical, would of itself establish free will. But I have never dreamt of crediting introspection with such authority. Introspection can discern nothing but mental experiences, along with their objects *qua* objects if they have any; and on several occasions I have expressly acknowledged that the 'belief' element discerned by introspection in the experience of moral decision may be an *illusory* belief, and that a philosophical defence of free will cannot base itself upon this *alone*, but must take into account a large number of other relevant considerations.

I had hoped I had made my attitude on this matter fairly plain even in the condensed statement in the *Mind* article with which Bradley is specially concerned. There, for example, on p. 463, after detailing my introspective findings, I add: "These beliefs may of course be illusory, but that is not at present in point. For the present argument all that matters is whether beliefs of this sort are in fact discoverable in the moral agent in the situation of 'moral temptation'." Furthermore, in the penultimate paragraph of the same paper, I not merely agree about, but lay stress upon, the importance of the question whether the apparently inexpugnable conviction that accompanies moral decision is *true*. That question, I reminded the reader, fell "outside the purview of the present paper". But it falls, of course, within the purview of certain other, more constructively intentioned, writings of mine on the free-will problem; and there, however faultily, it is dealt with.[9]

I think I can see, nevertheless, how the misunderstanding has arisen. It *is* my view that, *qua* moral agent actually engaged in the situation of moral temptation, one feels an absolute assurance that one is 'contra-causally' free; and it may well be that at times I have spoken of the 'assurance of freedom' without making it as clear as I ought that it was not an assurance *qua* moral philosopher, but only an assurance *qua* moral agent, that I had in mind. If so, I must certainly accept some responsibility. I do not think that, in its context, anything said in my later writings should have created the wrong impression,

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[9] I might especially mention *In Defence of Free Will* (1938), pp. 17 *et seq.*, and *On Selfhood and Godhood*, pp. 170 *et seq.*

but I agree that there are ambiguous phrases in *Scepticism and Construction,* from which Bradley quotes; though even in this early work so much is said that is irreconcilable with Bradley's understanding of these phrases that I am a little surprised that they have misled him.[10]

It is, of course, only as a result of this misunderstanding that Bradley can conclude his general account of my position with the words "if Campbell is right [about the bearing of introspection upon the free-will problem], further discussion and argument about the free-will problem will clearly be pointless." I hope it will be clear now that this is not at all an implication of my position.

I must now try to show the extent to which Bradley's specific criticisms are vitiated by this basic misunderstanding. I shall, however, pass over criticism (1), which is in effect an attack upon the value of introspection as a method of knowledge. On this large matter I have already said all that I think I can profitably say in the available space.

Criticism (2) opens with the statement that my thesis is "that against all argument it *can be shown* that man has the power to (and often does) interrupt the causal order." I take exception to the word 'shown'; and still more so to the expression 'against all argument', if by this is meant that I recognise no need for anything beyond introspective observation. Bradley then goes on to argue that since *no* kind of observation, internal any more than external, can establish a negative existential proposition like "there is no cause for this event", I must be wrong in holding that in introspection we directly observe an interruption of the causal order. But of course what we observe in introspection, for me, is not 'an interruption of the causal order', but a *belief* that one is bringing about such an interruption. Introspection (so far as veridical) establishes not a 'negative existential proposition', but the positive existential proposition that there exists, in my experience as a moral agent in the situation of moral temptation, a belief of a certain kind. The sense in which, in that situation, one believes that one is interrupting the causal order, I have already explained. It is perhaps worth repeating, however, that it is not a belief that one's moral decision is, without qualification, 'uncaused'. For my experience, 'I' cause it; but by a *creative* causality which is incompatible with causal *continuity.*

Criticism (3) begins "Campbell contends that we can *know* that such propositions as 'My will is contra-causally free' . . . are true . . . if we examine the contents of our own consciousness by inner perception."

Again my contention is mis-stated. That introspection can provide us with valuable positive evidence for the proposition's truth, I do claim. For, in my view, it discloses a belief in 'contra-causal' freedom which may reasonably be described as what the activity of making a moral decision intrinsically implies for the agent *qua* active; and this, for reasons given in the *Mind* article[11] and elsewhere, seems to me a disclosure of great importance. But I do not contend that it *establishes* the proposition in question.

Bradley continues "I shall now argue that this cannot be the case, firstly because the data of introspection do not in fact include *any* propositions, and, secondly, because such propositions cannot even be said to *report* such data, let alone report them correctly."

I agree of course that propositions cannot be included among the data of introspection. I agree also that such a proposition as 'My will is contra-causally free' could not 'report' a datum of introspection, since the data of introspection are experiences, and this proposition does not report an *experience*. But all this does not touch the view I hold.

In developing criticism (3), however, Bradley raises and discusses a more debatable point, about the meaning of 'feel' in such expressions as 'I feel free', 'I feel I could (categorically) have acted otherwise', and the like. His conclusion is the startling one that "none of these expressions can strictly be said to report a mental event, feeling, occurrence, sensation, or datum of any kind". When—to take the example to which Bradley devotes most attention—I say 'I feel free', I mean, it appears, no more and no less than 'I am free'. "Thus a person might equally well say either of these things if he had recently been discharged from the army . . . and in each case he would be telling us that he is now able to exercise a capacity in circumstances where he had previously been under pressure or constraint of some sort."

Surely this will not do at all. If, after discharge from the army, I say 'I am free', I am intending to inform my audience of the objective fact that I am no longer subject to the obligations and restrictions of military service. If, in the same situation, I say 'I feel free', I am trying to tell my audience something of the

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[11] P. 462. See also *In Defence of Free Will*, pp. 26-7, and *On Selfhood and Godhood*, pp. 216-7.

happy state of mind that attends my recognition that I am no longer subject to such obligations and restrictions. These are two quite distinct pieces of information, demanding (and normally receiving) quite distinct verbal forms for their communication. I really cannot see that there is much room for argument about this.

The statement 'I feel I could have acted otherwise', made in reference to a moral decision one has taken, is a good deal more complicated. One is not reporting an *emotive* state (like the elated recognition of the previous example), but it seems to me clear that one is reporting a mental state of another kind, viz. a state of *belief*. The word 'feel' is used, and deemed to be appropriate (very much as when we say 'I *feel* that man's a crook') because the belief in question is of an intuitive or quasi-intuitive character. It is not a 'discursive' belief resting on what would ordinarily be called 'grounds'. It is a belief inherent in the very experience of moral-decision activity. It might be described, as I suggested earlier, as indicating what the taking of a moral decision intrinsically implies for the moral agent who takes it.

At any rate, whatever be the precise analysis of these expressions, it seems to me beyond doubt that we cannot conjure away the reference to subjective states from those that use the term 'feeling' any more than we can interpolate such a reference into those that don't. Bradley's assertion that there is no difference between "the criteria for the correct use of the expression 'I feel free' and the expression 'I am free'" seems to me to fly in the face of plain facts.

The difficulty of pin-pointing in Bradley's argument what is relevant to criticism of my own position, already considerable on account of the major misunderstanding earlier noted, is enhanced in his concluding pages by the curious 'identification of differents' to which I have just alluded. I must not close, however, without a word or two about the 'ordinary language' criterion as applied to the free-will problem. This has been hovering in the background throughout Bradley's paper, but towards the end it comes right out into the open.

It is perfectly true, of course, that ordinarily "we do not talk about being 'contra-causally free', but just about being free". It may even be true (though I doubt it) that "to the ordinary person it conveys nothing more than, for example, does the phrase 'contra-causally happy'; that is, nothing at all." But in all sincerity, and with all respect, I submit that this doesn't matter a brass farthing. Nothing whatever follows from the ordinary

person's bewilderment at a phrase like 'contra-causally free' except that he is neither a psychologist nor a philosopher—which we knew, and he knew, already. *Naturally* his 'feeling' that he is free in the situation of moral temptation is left by him quite unanalysed. *Naturally* he has no clear notion of how the freedom he 'feels' here resembles and differs from the freedom (which, in certain circumstances, he would also claim) 'to act in accordance with the determination of his will'. Of the latter, 'physical' freedom he has, no doubt, a clear idea enough. For the understanding of it makes no demand upon any kind of specialist expertise. But to analyse the experience which leads the ordinary man to avow himself 'free' in the situation of moral temptation is another matter altogether. This is a task for introspective psychology; and my contention is that a major result of such analysis is to show that the freedom claimed in the situation is of a kind which can compendiously (though not with the strictest accuracy) be described as 'contra-causal'. I should no more expect a man to understand what that means if he were unacquainted with the psychological analysis which leads up to it than I should expect him to understand what is meant by 'curved space' if he were unacquainted with the mathematico-physical analysis which leads up to that. The appeal to 'ordinary language' has its place in philosophy. But to demand that every term used by a philosopher should be meaningful to Tom and Dick and Harry and Uncle Tom Cobley and all seems to me to betray a curious failure to grasp the provenance and purpose of the use of technical terms in disciplined intellectual enquiry.

Glasgow University.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

By J. J. C. SMART

Mr. Passmore's criticisms of my lecture on the Existence of God[1] are well taken and I now agree almost wholeheartedly with them[2]. And Professor Boyce Gibson is quite right in convicting me of irrationalism.[3] But I now draw a different moral from the one Professor Gibson seems inclined to draw.

[1] In his brilliant review article "Christianity and Positivism", this *Journal*, vol. 35, 1957, pp. 125-136.
[2] In particular, I now think that 'Does God exist?' is a proper question, to be answered 'Yes' or 'No', just as I have argued (this *Journal*, May 1956) that 'Do electrons exist?' is a proper question.
[3] "Philosophers Consider Religion", this *Journal*, vol. 35, 1957, pp. 170-185.

It does now seem to me irrational to continue to subscribe to traditional religion. But this is not *purely* for philosophical reasons, if by 'philosophical reasons' is meant a conceptual investigation, or logical analysis. Or to put it another way, I do not wish to hold, as I did when I wrote the articles in question, that philosophy is *just* logical analysis. Consider Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*. Is this an analysis of ordinary language about minds? Not quite, because in ordinary language it is intelligible to talk of a mind leaving a body. Perhaps you will say that such talk might be inconsistent. As against this: (1) Ordinary language is not a formal system, so it is not quite clear what would be meant by calling it inconsistent, for any apparent inconsistencies can be got round by ad hoc conventions. (2) Even if it were inconsistent it could still be useful, because so long as people do not recognize the inconsistencies they cannot use the schema of logical inference which enables them to deduce any proposition whatever from the inconsistency. It seems true to say that the trouble with the soul is not that it is an absurd notion but that it is an unnecessary and out-moded scientific hypothesis (e.g. to explain dreams). What Ryle has done is to give a rational reconstruction of our talk about minds which enables us to say whatever we need for the purposes of practical life, history, ethics, aesthetics, and above all science. I do not deny the abstract possibility of supernaturalist reconstructions. Such a reconstruction might preserve orthodox Christianity against philosophical objections. Thus our reconstruction might leave place for a special faculty of intellectual intuition, and for a special sense of 'necessary' such that 'necessary being' was not self-contradictory, the necessity of something existing being known by intuition.

But who could accept such a rational reconstruction of language in the light of modern science? (Even though such a reconstruction could survive purely philosophical objections, such as that it is inconsistent or that 'no sense has been given to certain signs in our propositions', as Wittgenstein would have put it.) More and more it seems that man is just part of nature. In the light of modern science he appears to be a very complicated physico-chemical mechanism, who arose by natural selection from simpler mechanisms, and there may well be millions of planets in the Universe with similar, or higher, forms of life on them. Christianity seems too man-centred[4] a doctrine to be believable.

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[4] In a way it is God-centred. But man occurs in a very central role in the Christian story, which was surely a more plausible doctrine in the days in which the earth was thought to be at the centre of the Universe, heaven above, hell below. These are nineteenth century objections, but none the worse for that, in that they bring out the great arrogance, allied to pseudo-humility, of much theological writing.

And the same goes for various forms of non-naturalistic meta-physical reconstructions of language.[5] Bertrand Russell had a profound insight when he pointed out the way in which Christianity appeals to man's vanity. Even those forms of it which consign the majority of men to endless torments in Hell are gratifying to our vanity. How flattering that the Creator of the Universe should interest himself in our cosmic peccadilloes!

In short, I think it better to say, as some of the Americans do, that philosophy is not analysis of language but that it is rational reconstruction of language. It now seems to me that the sort of reconstruction of language which would leave room for theology would have to make use of notions, such as those of the soul and intellectual intuition, which are scientifically quite unacceptable.

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[5] See my note 'Plausible Reasoning in Philosophy', *Mind*, vol. 66, 1957. pp. 75-8.

CRITICAL NOTICE

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY: THIRD SERIES. Ed. H. D.
Lewis. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., New York:
Macmillan Company. 501 p. 35s. (U.K.).

The first two series of *Contemporary British Philosophy*
appeared in 1924-5. Looking back at them from our present
vantage-point, we are naturally struck by the inclusion of writers
we should not now regard as being of the slightest importance
in the history of philosophy—Belfort Bax and Douglas Fawcett,
for example—and no less struck by the absence of now-familiar
names, not always, of course, as a result of editorial decision.
Bradley would not contribute; neither Cook Wilson nor any of
his followers did so; nor did Stout, Alexander or Whitehead.
Yet although, for these reasons, the two series are not a wholly
adequate guide to the philosophical tendencies of their time, the
fact remains that Muirhead, considering its difficulty, succeeded
remarkably well in the task he set before himself: "to give the
contributors an opportunity of stating authentically what they
regard as the main problem of philosophy and what they have
endeavoured to make central in their own speculations upon it".
Russell's "Logical Atomism" and Moore's "Defence of Common-
sense" are the best-known examples of what Muirhead achieved,
but other contributions, if of less intrinsic philosophical
importance, still admirably fulfilled Muirhead's intentions.

Thus Muirhead's two volumes have a unity of tone, for all
their diversity of content, which is conspicuously absent in the
third series. The editor, however, is not entirely to blame; new
tendencies in philosophy have immensely complicated his task. It
is not merely that philosophers no longer construct systems.
Muirhead had already noted that "British philosophers for good
or ill have inherited a profound distrust of philosophical
'systems'". The change lies deeper: many philosophers are not
now prepared to admit that any particular problem is, in the old
sense, "central to philosophy", as Moore, certainly no system-
builder, thought that the defence of common-sense was central,
and Russell thought that "logical atomism" was central. To "see
the light" about common-sense, or about atomic propositions, was
to experience, they thought, a philosophical conversion: over the
whole terrain of philosophy the mists would roll away.
Nowadays, on the contrary, most philosophers adopt Russell's

precept that philosophy is piecemeal investigation, in preference
to imitating his practice of generalising. Inevitably, then, the
third series of *Contemporary British Philosophy* is a miscel-
laneous collection. The essays it contains will serve to illustrate
the interests and the powers of their authors but, for the most
part, they could as happily have appeared in *Mind* or *The
Philosophical Quarterly* as in *Contemporary British Philosophy*.

But even allowing for the difficulty, with philosophy as it is,
in constructing a volume which would serve in a representative
capacity, the third series is strikingly unsatisfactory in this
respect. Of all the contributors only one, L. J. Russell, was
educated at Cambridge, and he left it in 1910; one Cambridge
lecturer, A. C. Ewing, is included, but he would be the first to
admit that he does not typify the philosophical approach which
won for Cambridge its fame as a nursery of philosophers. Of the
younger Oxford men, there is only Stuart Hampshire, and he in
an essay which is notably personal and unorthodox. So to use the
third series as a jumping-off place for a general comment on
contemporary philosophy in Britain would be completely to
misjudge the situation; a reviewer can do little more than
catalogue the individual essays.

Two contributors, however, carry on the Muirhead tradition
—both of them, significantly enough, of Continental origin—
Karl Popper in his "Three Views Concerning Human
Knowledge" and F. Waismann in "How I See Philosophy".
Popper's "three views" are "essentialism"—for which scientific
theories are attempts to describe "ultimate realities"; instru-
mentalism, which sees in them a device for coping with
experience; and his own view, that they are "highly informative
guesses about the world which, although not verifiable (i.e.
capable of being shown to be true) can be submitted to severe
critical tests" (p. 382). To understand why he prefers this
third view is to reach the heart of Popper's philosophical position.

Popper's objections to essentialism and instrumentalism are
partly pragmatic: essentialism, he says, puts a stop to enquiry
by suggesting that there are realities about which no further
questions can be asked, instrumentalism degrades science by
reducing it to a technique. Scientists, he suggests, have recently
been attracted to the instrumentalist analysis of science because
they imagine that it frees them from the encumbrances of
"philosophy"—which they identify with essentialism. Science,
they wish to argue, consists in so manipulating a symbolic system
as to express those technical innovations which enable us to cope
more effectively with experience; thus there is nothing more to

science than mathematics and technical manipulation—in each of which scientists feel thoroughly at home. A theory is a tool, to be picked up and used whenever it is handy, and set aside with as little compunction. Against this view, Popper makes two main points: first, that a theory can be refuted, whereas it is nonsense to talk about "refuting" a tool, and secondly, that instrumentalism rests upon a species of the despised essentialism, and so is not, even on the instrumentalist's interpretation of that phrase, "free from philosophy".

The first of these objections begs the question; for instrumentalists are usually quite ready to admit that theories cannot be refuted. A theory, they say, may turn out to be less generally useful than it was at first thought to be; new experiences may confront us, to which the theory was not applicable—just as a screw-driver may cease to be useful, or may come to have only a restricted usefulness, if screws of a novel shape are invented. But there can be no question of a theory turning out to be false; the predicates "true" and "false" do not apply to theories. "Physical theories", writes Toulmin in *The Philosophy of Science* (p. 112) "are not spoken of in practice as true, false or probable". Popper seems to suggest that, if he makes this sort of reply, the instrumentalist cannot account for scientific progress. But the instrumentalist would no doubt reply that progress consists in learning when to use a theory.

Popper's second objection to instrumentalism is more fundamental; indeed it leads to what I should myself regard as the central problem of philosophy. When the instrumentalist describes theories as "instruments" he is implicitly contrasting them with something which is not an instrument, something ultimate, the nature of which lies open to direct observation. This "something" may consist of ideas, of experiences, of atomic propositions, or of "facts"; but it can be generally described as "that with which the instrument of theory exists to cope". Most British philosophers since the seventeenth century have tried to discover what these ultimates are, and exactly how our "instruments" (theories, universal propositions, beliefs) enable us to deal with them. And what has clearly emerged from this prolonged travail is that the alleged "ultimates" always turn out to have precisely the characteristics which were supposed to be peculiar to the instruments. When Popper writes that "every description uses . . . universals; every statement has the character of a theory, a hypothesis", or when he rejects the distinction—except in a trivial sense—between what is "directly" and what is "indirectly" observable, he is challenging the tradition of British

philosophy precisely at the point at which that tradition needs to
be challenged. But more detail is needed—with which, it is hoped,
Popper will shortly supply us—before there can be any point
in making a close examination of his views.

Waismann's "How I see Philosophy" is equally un-British
in its conclusions. It falls into three parts. The first—very much
in Wittgenstein's style, and with the typical Wittgenstein
examples—expounds and illustrates Wittgenstein's thesis that
philosophy is a "fog-dispeller". But although Waismann so far
follows Wittgenstein as to maintain that fog-dispelling is one of
the main functions of philosophy, he will not admit that this is
its only function. For one thing, he argues, philosophical
questions—the doubts of the sceptic, in particular—may draw
our attention to the ways in which "ordinary language" directs
and moulds our thinking; the philosopher helps us to see that
there are other possibilities, possibilities our language does not
admit. In so doing he is bound to talk what is literally nonsense,
just because he is trying to pass beyond the limits of his own
language. But this is not a just objection, Waismann argues, to
his procedures. One function of the philosopher, indeed, is to
talk the kind of nonsense which loosens our minds, breaks down
our rigid categories.

Secondly, philosophical questions, according to Waismann,
may pass over into science: in the history of thought we can
watch them being transferred from typical philosopher's questions
—blurred, vague, queer-sounding—to precise scientific problems.
"There is nothing like clear thinking", writes Waismann, "to
prevent one from making discoveries" (p. 464). If we condemn
a question at first hearing because it is not yet precise, or even
meaningful, it will never be our lot to achieve that new and
deeper insight which true philosophers, and those scientists who
revolutionise their subjects, are perpetually seeking. Like Popper,
Waismann's emphasis is on discovery, rather than on security
against error (or against nonsense).

The second part of Waismann's essay is a criticism of the
ordinary presumption that there are *proofs* in philosophy—a
criticism directed in part against Ryle. Now in so far as
Waismann is denying that the philosopher can construct proofs
by deducing conclusions from axioms, he makes out his case.
But he goes further than this: he wants to deny that *proofs of
any sort* are possible in philosophy. No doubt, as he argues, it is
always possible to evade a philosophical proof by challenging its
premises, since the premises are not "self-evident". But when
in ordinary life, or indeed in most scientific work, we claim to

have "proved" a proposition, the same applies; our proof can in principle be evaded, or even—a weakness sometimes supposed to be peculiar to philosophical proofs—turned against us. If we have argued that r, because p and q, we may be met with the reply that since not r, either not p or not q. To the argument that Socrates must be mortal, because he is a man, it is possible in principle to reply either that Socrates cannot be a man, since he is not mortal, or that not all men are mortal, since Socrates clearly is not. One may not wish entirely to assimilate philosophical proofs to such everyday empirical reasonings—but they are not unsuccessful attempts at an axiomatised ontology, either. This is a matter which deserves much more consideration than a review permits; I can only, now, point to the extreme implausibility of such statements as that "all the proofs, in a good book on philosophy, could be dispensed with, without its losing a whit of its convincingness". (Or is, say, the first part of Plato's *Parmenides* not "a good book on philosophy"?)

One can agree with Waismann, of course, that "a new approach like that of Wittgenstein is never deduced"—but the same is true of "new approaches" in science. The question still remains, as in science, how to demonstrate that the new approach is a genuine advance in understanding; for mountebanks and maniacs, too, may present a "new approach". I welcome Waismann's insistence, in the third part of his essay, that "at the living centre of every philosophy is a vision" in so far as it represents a challenge to the cautious academicism which at present prevails in British philosophy. But the question still remains how, if not in virtue of his reasonings, the philosopher is to be distinguished from the prophet or the visionary. If scholasticism is the main evil to which British philosophy is at present subject, one would still not wish it to swing to the opposite extreme represented by the worst sort of Continental theorising. Perhaps the main task for philosophy at the moment is to find a third way between contemporary British and contemporary Continental philosophy. Waismann's essay may contribute to that end. At least it raises some of the main issues in a forcible and forthright way.

A number of other essays have as their theme the nature of philosophy. H. J. Paton, in his "Fifty Years of Philosophy" is mainly autobiographical; his judgment on recent philosophy is that it over-emphasises science—a judgment which is a just description of logical positivism, but is very strange indeed if it is meant to refer either to Wittgenstein or to contemporary Oxford philosophy. F. C. Copleston hopes to find a place for

"philosophical knowledge", while admitting that philosophy discovers no new facts; his conclusion is that the philosopher makes explicit what is only implicit in non-philosophical experience. Copleston's special concern is to show how, in everyday experience, the philosopher can discover an implicit transcendental metaphysics. Copleston does not wish to maintain that — normally at least — man has a direct experience of a transcendent being. The philosopher who asserts the transcendent, he rather suggests, is making explicit what is an implicit ingredient in our experience of finitude, although this "making explicit", Copleston is ready to admit, does not amount to proof of the reality of transcendence. Indeed, "inference" to a transcendent being, he maintains, is not syllogistic argument, or indeed any sort of reflective argument. What sort of inference it is remains to be explained; phrases like "making explicit" are by no means self-intelligible.

Professor H. D. Lewis in his "Worship and Idolatry" is concerned with similar issues, although, unlike Copleston, he lays great stress on "religious experience". On the face of it, he admits, not all men at all times have seen in their everyday experience evidence of transcendence; for even religion—as in paganism—has often been distinctly earthly in its ritual and doctrine. Lewis tries to show that this appearance of earthliness is misleading, that paganism involves a consciousness, however confused, of transcendent reality.

Lewis' essay may lead us to wonder whether it is philosophy or theology, and what is the relation between the two. This is Professor H. A. Hodges' theme in his "What is to Become of Philosophical Theology?" He begins by presenting an up-to-date version of the old doctrine that philosophy is the hand-maid of theology; it is not the task of the philosopher to create a theology, nor to argue against its possibility, he suggests, but rather to examine the logical structure and linguistic peculiarities of theological discourse. He admits, however, that such an analysis will bring to light a number of very special difficulties attaching to such discourse; and in particular will issue in the conclusion that it cannot be conducted in terms of an empiricist logic. He is not prepared to accept the view, then, that theology can be founded on a special variety of experience—"religious experience". The theologian needs, Hodges rather concludes, a "new logic": in the sense, that is, of new views about what human thinking and human language are able to achieve. In the end, he suggests, the choice of a logic is an ethical choice; to be an empiricist is to choose to adopt a certain "life-pattern", to be a theologian one

must adopt a different pattern. (That such choices are justified and inevitable is Professor L. J. Russell's main contention in his "Belief and Action".)

Hodges' essay is an interesting specimen of the manner of philosophising Mr. Stuart Hampshire condemns, in his "Identification and Existence", as "the new scepticism". Traditionally, as Hampshire points out, philosophers have set up some particular form of statement as a touchstone by which other statements are to be judged: for Plato a statement is imperfect unless it asserts relations between timeless entities, for empiricists a statement is meaningless unless it can be reduced to an assertion, or a set of assertions, about "experiences". Reacting against this approach to philosophy, a good many contemporary philosophers have maintained that each type of statement has its own logic. Philosophy, they have said, should be content to explore and record the differences between different types of statements; it should not value one type of discourse at the expense of another.

This means that there can be no general subject—philosophy —understood as concerning itself with what is common to all discourse; there is only the philosophy of religion, of morality, etc. Hampshire, on the contrary, believes that philosophy can still be undertaken systematically as a study of those most general notions—existence, identity, truth, for example—on which all thought and all language depend. Leibniz, he suggests, rather than Hume, should now be our teacher.

Furthermore, Hampshire considers, we are not obliged to regard all forms of discourse as equally satisfactory; we can come to see that certain types of discourse (e.g. religious discourse) involve ontological commitments which, for philosophical reasons, we are unable to accept—not because logic proves the discourse to be self-contradictory, nor because scientific experiment reveals that there are no entities of the sort the discourse professes to describe, but because those entities are so described that, on our philosophical views about the conditions under which a class of entities can be identified, it would be impossible to identify them. Suppose, for example, somebody introduces into discourse a reference to "the great impersonal forces in history". Then this phrase is not self-contradictory, nor is the objection to it just that experiment reveals no such forces; the real objection is the philosophical one: that there is no way in which such forces can be identified. Most of Hampshire's essay is an attempt to work out criteria of identification; but the interesting general point is his revolt against contemporary

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tendencies in philosophy, even if this revolt takes the form of a gesture of dissatisfaction rather than a clearly enunciated alternative. Hampshire, one can feel confident, would not be content with the traditional view — which Dr. A. C. Ewing restates in "The Necessity of Metaphysics"—that metaphysics is "the attempt to construct a wholly coherent system out of experience", but it is not yet clear quite what *vould* satisfy him.

Of the other more general essays, Professor A. J. Ayer's "Philosophical Scepticism" is a clear exposition of the various ways in which the traditional arguments of the sceptic have recently been replied to, with some critical reflections on these replies; R. I. Aaron in "The Rational and the Empirical" examines the doctrine that there is a sharp distinction between "rational" and "empirical" inquiries and argues, in opposition to it, that inquiry intimately conjoins experience and reasoning.

Three of the contributors select epistemological themes. In his "On Seeing and Hearing" Professor W. H. F. Barnes tries to show, in opposition to Ryle, that when we see something, we have a private experience of seeing, which is not accessible to public inspection. He does not wish to assert that we see a replica of physical objects (an "image") but only that we and we only—except in so far as we care to communicate this knowledge to other people—can *know* that we are seeing. Seeing and hearing, he agrees with Ryle, are neither activities, nor processes nor states; but they are, he says, "experiences".

It is not clear what illumination this conclusion is meant to cast; for no word in the whole philosophical vocabulary has been used in a wider variety of senses than "experience". Barnes bases his argument on what we "ordinarily say"; paradoxically enough, his is the only contribution which makes extensive use of this method of reasoning. "We ask people about their experiences", Barnes writes; "people tell us about their experiences. We never suppose that we can observe their experiences or that they can observe ours" (p. 80). This is certainly true in one sense of the word "experience"; when we ask a person to relate his "experiences" we ordinarily wish him to describe those events in his history which we did not share, the occurrences which, just for that very reason, it will be of interest to us to hear about. But there are many other ways of using the word. One can intelligibly refer to "shared experiences"; and if somebody says "Wasn't that an embarrassing experience I had yesterday?" can agree simply in virtue of one's observations. ("I observed that the experience was acutely embarrasing to him.") In the special case of seeing and hearing, again, although it would sound odd

to say "I noticed him seeing such and such" we can quite well say "I noticed that he saw Smith, but refused to recognise him", or "I noticed that although he heard the bell, he did not answer it." We may in such cases be wrong; the person in question may not have seen Smith or may not have heard the bell. But equally we may be wrong about our own seeing; we may think we see something whe⁵ we are in fact suffering from an hallucination. Barnes, then, has not shown that seeing is a private experience; but he does, in the course of his essay, raise difficulties for Ryle's view that "seeing" and "hearing" are achievement-words. And the essay may serve, too, as an example of the complications which arise when "ordinary language" arguments are applied to words like "experience".

Ryle himself confesses—in his "Sensation"—to some qualms about his earlier account in *The Concept of Mind* of sensory perception. He thinks he can show that philosophers are wrong if they suppose, in Barnes's manner, that perceiving involves having "a sensation" or "a feeling". This way of describing perception, he considers, rests on the false presumption that perceiving a misprint, for example, *must* be an inference, and that therefore there *must* be data (sensations) on which the inference is based. Alternatively, it is a corollary of the equally confused doctrine that sense-impressions are necessary in order to "fill out the causal chain" which leads from nerve processes to mental experiences. At the same time, Ryle is still inclined to think that there is some affinity between seeing a misprint and having an after-image; and he does not know how to describe in what that affinity consists except by using the language of sense-data.

Professor H. H. Price, too, in "The Argument from Illusion" discusses the epistemology of perception, but, as one might expect, in a considerably more detailed and technical fashion. He reconsiders a traditional argument designed to show that all our visual experience must be illusory: the argument that although things can have only one shape and one size, they regularly appear to change in shape and size as they alter their position in relation to us. These "different shapes and sizes", Price argues, are *real* differences in the proportion of our visual field an object occupies, or in its angular relations to us. So there is no question of illusion on this point, and no general argument from perspective illusions against the reliability of visual perception. Once this is realised, Price thinks, particular

abnormalities in perception can be discussed as individual anomalies, without their tending to throw any doubt upon the general reliability of perception.

Three of the remaining essays are ethical. Professor D. M. Mackinnon restates ethical intuitionism in the language of contemporary moral philosophy. Mr. J. D. Mabbott argues that recent "analyses" of "responsibility" and "punishment", although they profess merely to describe the "ordinary use" of these words, are in fact attempts to change our usage, to persuade us that we *ought* only to punish in order to reform—a view Mabbott roundly condemns on the ground that it degrades human personality, takes away from human beings the responsibility for their acts, and turns them into raw material for the Utopias of totalitarian "reformers". In an essay which is less directly ethical, but is meant to have ethical implications, Professor C. A. Campbell states a case for the conception of "self-activity". Careful introspective analysis of any situation where there is a conflict between duty and desire, he argues, will reveal in a clear and unmistakable fashion the existence and nature of self-activity.

In the one political essay, Professor H. B. Acton describes and relates the various general grounds—an appeal to Natural Law, to custom, or to the common good—on which a citizen might justify his obedience to the decrees of the Government, or to which a Government might refer in order to justify its decrees to its citizens. Professor J. N. Findlay's "An Examination of Tenses" does not fit neatly into any category. Considering the two main ways of expressing time—as past, present and future (McTaggart's A series) or as earlier, simultaneous and later (McTaggart's B series)—Findlay argues that both are necessary to us in our dealings with experience, but that the first, the tensed, has certain advantages. It helps us to remember that we always perceive *from a changing standpoint;* we then have less temptation to think of ourselves as transcendental, outside history. As well, the tensed mode of expression draws our attention to the difference between a past which has left a recognisable mark on the present and a future which is still dark and uncertain: this cosmic asymmetry of past and future is essential to our everyday experience of the world. But Findlay does not discuss the conflict between tensed and untensed modes of expression in the main context in which it has recently arisen, as the issue whether differences of tenses are to be regarded as part of the formal apparatus of logic, or as part of the material with which it deals.

That on the other hand is the kind of consideration with which Mr. William Kneale's "The Province of Logic" is principally concerned. This is a forbidding-looking but not really difficult[1] essay in which Kneale, in some respects at one with Hampshire, sets out to defend the conception of a general logic— as opposed to the view that each class of expression "has its own logic". Such a general logic will describe the principles of reasoning which are valid for every type of subject-matter. More specifically, it is the general theory of what—following Carnap— Kneale calls "logical involution": the relation holding between two sets of propositions S_1 and S_2, when it is impossible that all the members of S_1 should be true without at least one member of the set S_2 also being true. Kneale believes that in terms of this definition of logic one can show why logic works with a special and limited vocabulary ("all", "not", etc.), without, in Quine's manner, merely stipulating that this shall be so; the full sense of these signs—but not of other candidates for the rôle of logical signs—can be given in rules of involution. Thus they are in a special position: they are the only truly general and formal signs in reasoning. This is an important essay, which deserves close consideration.

JOHN PASSMORE

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[1] Particularly when the misprints are corrected with the aid of Kneale's note in *Mind* (April, 1957).

F

REVIEWS

A HUNDRED YEARS OF PHILOSOPHY. By John Passmore. London:
Duckworth, 1957. 508 p. 35s. (U.K.).

I asked a young philosopher what she thought of this book.
"Oh," she replied, "I am just grateful." And that I am sure
will be the predominant feeling it arouses. The amount of work
that has gone into it is prodigious. Every English philosopher
of any importance in the last hundred years is mentioned; a good
many are discussed at considerable length; there are very few
upon whom Passmore does not throw new light. I fully expect
that a new note of erudition will appear in essays of philosophy
students as a result of this book.

Take for instance the case of F. H. Bradley. Passmore
tells me (what I have never known) that the Christian
existentialist, Marcel, was profoundly influenced by Bradley. He
reminds me (of what I had completely forgotten) that T. S.
Eliot saw affinities between the philosophies of Leibniz and
Bradley. He supplies me with dozens of references to articles in
Mind, which I doubt whether I will ever use. On top of this,
he provides the best short statement of the central tendencies of
Bradley's metaphysics that I have ever come across. Only a man
who really knew Bradley could have done this; it is equally
useful whether one wants to read Bradley or merely to read
about him; and it is all exceptionally readable.

Consider, then, that Passmore's index of names ranges from
Aaron to Zyburn; that to all appearance he is equally at home
with all of them; and the nature of his achievement begins to
appear. The book is a mine of information and a monument of
scholarship. Nobody interested in the subjects can afford to be
without it.

Why then do I find it a depressing book? That may be due
to me; I am sure it is not due to Passmore; I am inclined to think
that it is due to his subject. So many names with so many books
and articles attached to them! Such industry! Such acuteness!
And what does it all amount to? It does not seem to be getting,
or even pointing, anywhere. It has certainly made precious little
difference to anybody. Out of the hundreds of names mentioned
here there are probably only a couple (Mill and Bertrand

Russell) who are known to the ordinary educated man, say, the university graduate who has not specialized in philosophy. And there seems to be some sort of moral here.

This is the age of the philosophy specialist. Unlike Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, practically all the men mentioned here, except Mill and Russell, have pursued their careers exclusively within the Philosophy Departments of universities. They have written mostly in specialized philosophy journals like *Mind*, which was founded in 1876. They have cultivated a special philosophical way of speaking. They have trained pupils who hope to become philosophers. They have looked each other over in philosophy conferences. It has all been a bit like the story of the two cats who attended a tennis match. One cat was intensely interested but the other cat could not understand it at all. "What do you want to come here for?" asked the bored cat. "I have got a family interest," said the other one. "My old man is in the racket."

<div align="right">R. P. ANSCHUTZ.</div>

FOUNDATIONS OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC. By R. F. Harrod. London:

Macmillan, 1956. 285 p. 24s. (U.K.).

Mr. R. F. Harrod is well known as an economist and as Keynes's biographer. This book places him in the line, as old as it is eminent, of British philosopher-economists.

Harrod thinks that induction needs justification and that it can be justified; that such justification must and can be neither empirical, nor pragmatic, nor trivial, but a priori; that such a justification can be given without Bayes' theorem, without indeed any "prior probabilities" at all, and consequently without invoking the Principle of Indifference. He thinks, too, that simple enumeration is a fundamental form of inductive inference, whereas what Keynes called analogy is not. These doctrines are so important, unpopular, substantially original, and (in my opinion) broadly true, that the book merits the widest reading. It is not likely to get it, in view of the failure to persuade of Donald Williams's book which in broad lines is very close to this one, but which is put in a better light than ever by the innumerable defects, some of them grievous, of this one.

In this review I have neglected all the chapters not directly related to induction, i.e. those on truth, memory, etc. They are greatly inferior to the rest of the book.

There are at least two principles, according to Harrod, which can be seen a priori to be true and which sanction a form of inductive argument; viz. the "Principle of Experience" and a principle of inverse probability.

The "Principle of Experience", "on which all science and all common-sense knowledge depend", states that "if we are crossing an expanse, but know not what part of it we have reached, we are unlikely to be on its extreme edge; when we say that this is 'unlikely' what we mean precisely is that if we always believe that we are on its extreme edge we shall much more often be wrong than right; and conversely" (p. 78). In general the chance that we shall find a certain continuity to persist for another $\frac{1}{x}$ of its previous length is $\frac{x}{x+1}$. Harrod identifies this probability with the proportion of times a traveller over a continuity who continually asked "Will it continue another $\frac{1}{x}$ of its length to date?" would be answered affirmatively by experience. When we want to know the probability *throughout* a continuity of another $\frac{1}{x}$ continuance, this formula has to be adjusted to avoid our counting again answers that at any point in the journey have already been given; we can take for this purpose the average of the ratios at all points of true *future* answers to all *future* answers to the traveller's question. This is $\frac{x^2}{(x+1)^2}$. Though weaker than the unadjusted formula, this still possesses the desired properties, of which the chief is that, as a journey continues, the probability of being able to continue another $\frac{1}{x}$, (which can always be made tolerably large by suitable choice of x), increases rapidly for any *absolute* length of continuance, since any absolute length of continuance becomes constantly a smaller fraction of the distance already travelled. This "law of the increasing probability of continuance" (p. 63) is a less popular expression of the Principle of Experience.

We employ this sort of induction wherever one continuity of whatever kind is concerned. Harrod calls it "unconditional simple induction". In "conditional simple induction", on the other hand, we are concerned with a *class* of continuities. In order to

be entitled to use the squared formulæ for predicting the continuance of the members of a class, we need to postulate that travellers' questions are equally distributed over all sectors of such continuities. The justification for this postulate, as it applies to cases "to date" (p. 76), is simply that experience reveals no tendency to the contrary—e.g. continuities do not tend to come to an end whenever we begin travelling on, i.e., observing, them; and as it applies to the future, the postulate is justified by unconditional simple induction from this experience. Unconditional simple induction, Harrod says, needs no parallel postulate; it is "a necessary fact, true by definition, that the traveller spends an equal amount of time in each sector of one continuity" (p. 65), and also pp. 56, 119, and 247.

The other main principle of induction is an inverse-probability theorem. The propositions which suitable evidence can probabilify according to it are of the form 'almost all P are Q'; the evidence which is suitable is a sample in which all P are Q. Such a sample Harrod calls "suggestive", to degree d, of almost all P being Q if such a sample is improbable ("deceptive") to degree d on the contrary supposition that some definite proportion of P, e.g. 95%, are Q. A fair-sampling postulate ensures that we will come across samples of degree d of deceptiveness not greater than $\frac{1}{d}$ times we come across samples (of equal size) of less deceptiveness. Thus we will go wrong in inferring 'almost all P are Q' from a sample in which all P are Q, if the probability of such a sample (on the hypothesis that, say, 95% P are Q) equals $\frac{1}{d}$, once in every d we meet a sample of that size; this entitles Harrod, by his definition of probability, to say that the probability which such a sample gives to the 'almost all P are Q' hypothesis $= 1 - \frac{1}{d}$.

But Harrod realises that as an inverse principle, "the probability of a hypothesis on the evidence = the improbability of the evidence if the hypothesis is false" is too good to be true. For the evidence to favour an hypothesis, it is not sufficient that we should be able to say that, as he puts it, such evidence would be rare if the hypothesis were not true. For perhaps such evidence *is* rare. However rare it would be if the hypothesis were false, such evidence does not favour the hypothesis if either it would be equally rare if the hypothesis is true or any different evidence

would be equally rare if the hypothesis is false. Therefore an acceptable inverse formula must take account of the rate at which samples (of the same size) as suggestive as the present sample are occurring in our general experience. Let this rate = $\frac{1}{x}$; then the probability of 'almost all P are Q' on the evidence of a sample in which all P are Q = $1 - \frac{x}{d}$. This quantity by which $\frac{1}{d}$ has to be divided Harrod calls "the deflator", and of course if the rate it represents is equal to $\frac{1}{d}$, the evidence has no tendency to favour the hypothesis; though if d is supra-astronomical or of the order of a billion, the deflator may be neglected, the hypothesis being practically certain anyway.

Harrod's principle is not applicable to inferences to definite frequencies of Q among P. But by concentrating on inferences from samples in which all P are Q to almost all P being Q he has taken advantage of a fact the importance of which for the philosophy of knowledge he is right in stressing. This is that samples of P deviating in their Q frequency by about one per cent. from their populations are enormously rarer in populations in which the Q-frequency is within a few per cent. of 100% than in populations in which the Q-frequency is within a few per cent. of 50%. It is this fact which gives agreeably large values for d. (Harrod's pp. 108-9 on the reasonableness of logicians' special interest in "all" are excellent.) And the fact that in general samples in which all the members have some property are extremely common entails that x is sufficiently smaller than d to yield the very great probability which we ascribe to such conclusions in science and common life on the basis of such evidence.

Harrod acknowledges that the deflator is usually extremely difficult to compute, and he attributes to this fact the numerical vagueness of most of our important inductive arguments. It also introduces an element of paradox, because, on Harrod's interpretation of it the probability of a hypothesis on some evidence is affected by an apparently irrelevant matter of fact, viz. the frequency with which in surrounding experience equally suggestive evidence is coming to hand. Harrod labours to render this paradox unparadoxical, to elicit this principle, indeed, from the very notion of probability (pp. 95-101).

Finally, the fair-sampling postulate is unnecessary, according to Harrod (pp. 111-119). Unconditional simple induction by

itself is sufficient to make it reasonable to argue from experience even if we don't know that we are not set down in an untypical part of nature; and, indeed, even if we know that we are. For by the Principle of Experience we are unlikely to be on an "edge" (an untypical part) of this edge (untypical part) of nature; therefore any bias is likely to continue. This is ingenious and the general lines at least of the argument are to my mind perfectly sound.

Arguments from certain resemblances between individuals to further resemblances are ordinarily regarded as independent, to say the least, of simple enumeration or sampling. In the chapter on "Natural Kinds" Harrod tries to show that such arguments are one form of sampling arguments. Suppose we regard a cat as a complex of equally readily observable features identified by occupancy of 26 specified positions within a spatial boundary; then if we find in a second such spatial region 13 of such features repeated and none so far not repeated, an inverse probability argument can be framed precisely as before. If there are in the second putative cat only 13 repeated features, we can calculate the improbability of our having observed all and only those; and so on. Similarly we can argue from the features observed in both to the probability of features in both as yet observed in neither (v. p. 127). All this is certainly ingenious and exciting, and there is undoubtedly at least some substance in it, though I cannot afford space for a discussion of it here; but it does not reduce eliminative to simple-enumerative or sampling induction, even if, as I believe, the former is a logically very derivative and sophisticated form of argument.

In this chapter Harrod reopens some of the territory first explored in Broad's famous *Mind* 1918-20 article. What he has to say (pp. 129-137) on natural kinds, on why some empirical definitions are better than others, and on unobservable scientific entities, I cannot afford space even to summarise, but it is good. One further topic demands mention, however, viz. Harrod's explanation of the possibility of establishing general propositions by a single instance (pp. 137-141). Where this appears to happen, he suggests, what has actually happened is that by previous simple enumeration from a vast sample we have established with high probability that a genus possesses a determinable property, which in its specific determinations holds within very fine limits of tolerance among members. I.e., the reason why we can argue so confidently from one test of the melting point of a new metal, say, is that we have great simple enumerative support for the hypothesis that the genus, metals, possesses as a determinable

the property of melting at some temperature, which in its specific determinations holds within a very narrow range. This is ingenious and surely contains a lot of truth; and so far as the appearance of the establishment of laws by a single instance is a chief support of those who try to avoid the very idea of inductive inference, it is an important contribution.

In the chapter on "Simplicity", Harrod discusses the reasonableness of preferring simple to complex explanations of the same phenomena. As a criterion of relative simplicity among laws, Harrod adopts, without discussion, the number of adjustable parameters they contain. He rejects (p. 149) the view that simple laws are a priori more probable than more complex ones, on the two (incompatible) grounds that we have no reason a priori to to ascribe to nature a preference for simplicity, and that the very notion of a priori probability conflicts with the essential relativity of probability to evidence. The rational ground for preferring simple to complex explanations of a set of observations is that if there were no law operating the occurrence of a set of observations conforming to any simple law would be rare, and rarer the larger the set; consequently when we have such a set we may argue inversely for the superior probability of the simple law. (Harrod confines "laws" to statements of functional relations among successive quantities.)

I am not sure how we are meant to regard the "first principle of induction" (p. 155) which Harrod formulates to entail the preferability of the simpler to the complex law. Some things he says suggest that this simplicity-principle ranks with the Principle of Experience and the inverse principle; yet this can hardly be so.

This leads me to a general criticism of the book. Not merely is the number of fundamental principles unclear, but the relations between them are spoken of in incompatible ways. Thus, e.g., on p. 78 "all science and all common-sense knowledge depend" on the Principle of Experience, while, e.g., on p. 252 the inverse principle is at "the very heart and centre of inductive logic", while elsewhere the two principles seem to be of equal status. This is untidy and unclear; but not only that: it creates a presumption that Harrod has not isolated the completely general principles of induction. This presumption is strengthened by the fact that while all of the principles are supposed to be true a priori, Harrod presents them as being each confined not merely in application but in meaning to special classes of enquiries—into uniformities in the case of the inverse principle, into the continuance of individual continuities in the case of unconditional

simple induction. The Principle of Experience, indeed, is in danger of being completely lost in its example; though when he is using it to dispense with the fair-sampling postulate Harrod (rightly) does not hesitate to apply it to "continuities" in a very much wider sense than that of individual extended entities.

A crucial point about the Principle of Experience itself is the assumption which seems to be implicit in the squared formula that the traveller spends an equal amount of time in equal sections of the continuity. Since this is precisely where the Principle of Indifference seems to be required, and since Harrod like many others rejects this Principle, it is a pity that his procedure here should be the strange one of saying repeatedly that this is not an assumption but is true by definition. I cannot find that it *is* true by definition, but if it were the question would be one of Harrod's right to make it so. This is doubly a pity because the Principle of Experience is undoubtedly at least a specification of the true a priori principles of induction.

I do not think as much can be said for Harrod's inverse principle, though it has a certain rough fidelity to reason. The argument of this chapter is not only difficult but devious and hopelessly informal. One does not want every one to write like Carnap; and in his chapter on "Probability" Harrod has good things to say on the addition theorem, on the anomalies connected with the interpretation of zero probability, and on the ubiquitous "h" which, having got in as more or less a notational convenience, stays on to plague the whole of Keynes's philosophy of probability. But Harrod starts from no clear-cut premises and states no theorems of probability which he is arguing in accordance with; and he doesn't bother about a notation. Consequently we need not hesitate to admit his claim to have produced an inverse principle free from the inscrutable prior probabilities which embarrass the usual one. But it is only too easy to avoid any unpalatable conclusions if one argues informally enough. The fact remains that any known valid deduction of an inverse theorem from the accepted fundamental theorems of the subject contains, both in the premises and the conclusion, not less than three terms or elements (whether these are interpreted as propositions or in some other way); consequently it is impossible without special assumptions to arrive at Harrod's inverse principle, whether in its deflated or its undeflated form.

What Harrod has principally in mind in his doctrine of the deflator is the fact that the improbability of the evidence on the contrary of the hypothesis is no argument for the hypothesis if contrary evidence is equally improbable on the contrary

hypothesis. If we neglect prior probabilities, this can be shown to be true even on the ordinary inverse principle, $h/e = 1 - \dfrac{e/{\sim}h}{e/{\sim}h + e/h}$ (using Keynesian notation and writing 'h' and 'e' for hypothesis and evidence respectively). If $e/{\sim}h = {\sim}e/{\sim}h$, this $= 1 - \dfrac{e/{\sim}h}{e/{\sim}h + {\sim}e/{\sim}h}$ and h/e on either principle $= \frac{1}{2}$. (Harrod's inverse principle seems to correspond exactly to the latter; the two are not in general equivalent.) But to refer to the denominator as a rate is grossly anomalous. Harrod subscribes to the view that probabilities are essentially relative to premises; a rate is a mere matter of fact truly or falsely stated, and I cannot see what such a matter of fact can be doing in a principle of this sort. The problem of induction arises, moreover, because what Harrod calls "our general experience" is from a logical point of view special; and consequently the rate at which among all samples of the same size equally suggestive samples are occurring is, besides being irrelevant, completely variable.

It is through taking the deflator as a rate that Harrod is led to defend the paradox that the probability of h on e is partly a function of the frequency with which "I" (pp. 100-101) come across evidence of this sort. We know that he does not mean that the experience of R. F. Harrod is a factor in all estimates of probability. But of course no actual person or race's experience is relevant, and the deflation of $h/e = 1 - e/{\sim}h$ that is undoubtedly called for is in fact that which is expressed in the denominator of the general inverse theorem; which as I have said is not a rate at all. Propositions ascribing a probability to a hypothesis on some evidence are one and all true or false a priori, on the view of probability Harrod accepts; consequently it is a contradiction to suggest that the same evidence may be good for a hypothesis at one time, viz. when suggestive samples abound, and not good for it at another, viz. when they do not (cf. pp. 96-97).

This is not the only point at which Harrod will dismay those who clearly distinguish, as he himself does in the main, the worthwhile enterprise of showing inductive conclusions to be sometimes reasonable from the absurd enterprise of showing them to be always or ever right. For example, he invariably says that the Principle of Experience entails that the traveller *will be right* $\dfrac{x^2}{(x+1)^2}$ of the times he expects another $\dfrac{1}{x}$ continuance. Again,

in dispensing with the fair-sampling postulate even where bias is known to exist, he tends to argue from our continued predictive success (which isn't assured) to the reasonableness of our inductive procedures (which doesn't follow). He even permits himself to say that "induction will have proved a valid instrument".

Two topics which call in my opinion for a critical examination I have no space to make are the sharp distinction in epistemological status Harrod makes between the past and the future (pp. 76 and ff.), and (not unconnected in his treatment) infinite populations.

There are some amazing slips. On p. 57 (once), p. 61 (once) and p. 247 (four times!), "true to false (answers)" should read "true to all".

D. C. STOVE.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Anscombe, G. E. M. Intention. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1957. x, 93 p. Stiff paper covers. 17/6 (Australian).

Careful and acute discussion, in the close-packed yet discursive Wittgenstein manner, of such questions as the difference between statements of intention and predictions, the difference between causes and reasons, whether there are *acts* of intention, the importance for intention of one particular description of an action as against all the others that might apply to it, and so on.

Anton, John Peter. Aristotle's theory of contrariety. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method). London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. xi, 251 p. 25s. (U.K.).

"In this book I shall try to demonstrate . . . that contrariety, as the basis on which distinctions are made, and as having a physical counterpart, provides a 'criterion' for the intelligibility of process."—p. 9.

Ball, F. N. Intellectual calculus. London, Thames Bank Publishing Co., 1957. xxii, 177 p. 21s. (U.K.).

The author is an expert on industrial relations who has become interested in the wider questions of social and political theory, and has arrived at the view that most social, political and international problems arise out of differences of opinion on matters on which "there can be no objective form of truth". He advocates tolerance, combined with a readiness to discard convention when there seems a clear gain in doing so.

Bates, Marston, and Humphrey, Philip S., eds. The Darwin Reader, London, Macmillan, 1957. ix, 481 p. 49/9d. (Australian).
Selections from Darwin's works.

Beckwith, Burnham P. Religion, philosophy and science; an introduction to logical positivism, New York. Philosophical Library, 1957. 241 p. $3.75.

Exposition, for the layman, of a crude and somewhat dated version of positivism. E.g.: "All moral problems and theories are superfluous or senseless. If they duplicate scientific problems and theories, they are superfluous. If not, they are senseless." (p. 235).

Buber, Martin. Pointing the way; collected essays, translated from the German and edited by Maurice Friedman. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. x, 239 p. 25s. (U.K.).

Charlesworth, M. J. Aristotle on art and nature. (Auckland University College Bulletin no. 50, Philosophy series no. 2.) Auckland, Auckland University College, 1957. 40 p. Paper covers. Price not given.

Clear, coherent and convincing reconstruction of the general æsthetic theory underlying Aristotle's *Poetics*. Argues that, for Aristotle, "art imitates nature" in the sense of bestowing form on unorganised matter, not in the sense of copying natural objects.

Chisholm, Roderick M. Perceiving: a philosophical study. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1957. xi, 203 p. $2.75.
Careful discussion of most of the familiar problems about perception. Well-trodden ground, but the author is usually sure-footed.

DURKHEIM, Emile. Professional ethics and civic morals; translated by Cornelia Brookfield. (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction). London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. xliv, 228 p. 30s. (U.K.).

First published in French in 1950. From Durkheim's notes for lectures given by him between 1890 and 1900. There is a lengthy introduction by Georges Davy, of the University of Paris.

EMMET, Dorothy. Function, purpose and powers; some concepts in the study of individuals and societies. London, Macmillan, 1958. vii, 300 p. 46/6d. (Australian).

An attempt to clarify some of the fundamental concepts used by writers on sociology and anthropology, and a consideration of their bearing on ethics, politics and the philosophy of religion. Clear, scholarly and illuminating.

FIREMAN, Peter. Justice in Plato's *Republic*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1957. 52 p. $2.

Very slight and somewhat incoherent essay. Much of it is simply quotation from Plato.

FORDHAM, Michael. New developments in analytical psychology. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. xiv, 214 p. 25s. (U.K.).

HALLETT, H. F. Benedict de Spinoza; the elements of his philosophy. University of London: The Athlone Press, 1957. xvi, 171 p. 25s. (U.K.).

"Though the treatment of its subject is relatively brief, and in its way 'popular' as avoiding over-elaboration and textual detail, this book is intended for the use of the candid student, and not for 'the man in the train' . . . perhaps the greatest hindrance to be met by the beginner is the 'popular' exposition that attempts to expound the thought of one age in terms of the favoured categories of another . . . For it is not easy for the modern mind steeped as it is in empiricistic modes of thought . . ., to take up the intellectual standpoint from which alone the thought of Spinoza is intelligible."—Preface.

HODGSON, Leonard. For faith and freedom; the Gifford Lectures, 1955-1957, in the University of Glasgow: vol. II, Christian theology. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1957. vii, 237 p. 41s. 6d. (Australian).

JONES, A. H. M. Athenian democracy. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1957. 198 p. 34/9 (Australian).

This clearly written and well-documented book by the Professor of Ancient History at Cambridge is a collection of four already published articles and one unpublished one, but it has a unity of theme and a structural development which belie its genesis. It is mainly historical and analytic, presenting a detailed account of the working of the Athenian democracy—economic, political and social—but a chapter on "The Athenian democracy and its critics" presents the criticisms of the philosophers which, as Professor Jones points out, are "certainly not representative of Athenian public opinion".

The author sees the main charges as four in number: (1) In a democracy each person lives as he likes, which is a bad thing; (2) in Plato's words, "it distributes a kind of equality to the equal and the unequal alike"; (3) the law is not sovereign—it is too frequently overridden by popular decrees; (4) democracy means "the rule of the poor majority over the rich minority in their own interest". Professor Jones examines these criticisms in turn, pointing out that some of them are based on disagreement with the democrats about the facts, others on "an entirely different conception of the functions of the State and an entirely

different estimate of human nature". "Political power", according to the philosophers, "must be given to a select group of wise good men", to enable them to impose, by a rigid system of education and control, a good way of life on the bulk of the citizens, who are "naturally evil or at least foolish". The democrats, on the contrary, having a much more optimistic view of human nature, held that "all citizens could be trusted to take their part in the government of the city and each should be allowed to live his own life in his own way". A.K.S.

LAMONT, Corliss. The philosophy of humanism. 4th ed. New York,. Philosophical Library, 1957. xi, 243 p. $2.49.

"This study, first published in 1949 under the title of *Humanism as a Philosophy*, constitutes an expansion and revision of a lecture course . . . given by me at Columbia University beginning in 1946."—Preface.

An able exposition and defence, aimed at the lay reader, of a view of the universe which resolutely rejects any appeal to the supernatural.

MACGREGOR, Geddes. The Vatican Revolution. London, Macmillan, 1958. xiii,. 210 p. 34s. 9d. (Australian).

A study, largely historical, of the dogma of papal infallibility.

MACMURRAY, John. The self as agent; being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in 1953. London, Faber and Faber, 1957. 230 p. 25s. (U.K.).

"Against the assumption that the self is, at least primarily, a 'knowing subject', I have maintained that its subjecthood is a derivative and negative aspect of its agency."—Introduction.

MANNHEIM, Karl. Systematic sociology; an introduction to the study of society. Edited by J. S. Eros and W. A. C. Stewart. (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction). London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. xxx, 169 p. 24s.

MOULYN, Adrian C. Structure, function and purpose; an inquiry into the concepts and methods of biology from the viewpoint of time. New York, Liberal Arts Press, 1957. viii, 198 p. $4.

"This book challenges the idea that spatial organic structure is purposeful . . . I shall set up the contrast: 'structure and function versus purpose' by correlating it with the contrast 'objective time versus subjective time'. The structure and function of living organisms are correlated with objective time, while purposive vital phenomena are correlated with subjective time."—p. 3.

PIDDINGTON, Ralph. An introduction to social anthropology. Volume II. Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1957. xvi, pp. 443-819. 30s. (U.K.).

POPKIN, Richard H., and STROLL, Avrum. Philosophy made simple. New York, Made Simple Books Inc., 1957. 191 p. Paper covers. $1.

There are sections on ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, the theory of knowledge, logic, and contemporary philosophy. Clear exposition and criticism, but, inevitably, scrappy and superficial.

POPPER, Karl R. The poverty of historicism. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. xiv, 166 p. 16s. (U.K.).

First publication in book form in English of a work which attracted some attention when it appeared in *Economica* in 1944-45. Argues against the view that there are historical "laws" which make prediction possible, and advocates social reform by means of "piecemeal engineering" as against large-scale "Utopian planning".

Postman, Leo, and Rau, Lucy. Retention as a function of the method of measurement. (University of California Publications in Psychology, vol. 8, no. 3). Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957. pp. 217-270. Paper covers. $1.

Price-Williams, D. R. Introductory psychology; an approach for social workers. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. viii, 203 p. 18s. (U.K.).

Rooff, Madeline. Voluntary societies and social policy. (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction). London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. xiv, 320 p. 35s. (U.K.).

Samuel, Herbert, 1st viscount. In search of reality. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1957. viii, 229 p. 47s. 3d. (Australian).

"This book is a contribution to the great debate, which is going on among thoughtful people everywhere and always, on the basic ideas of our present civilization"—Dust-jacket. To this end the author ranges over metaphysics, politics, ethics and religion. What he has to say on most of these topics is sensible, if rather superficial; but the book is addressed to the general reader.

Wolff, Hans M. Plato; der Kampf ums Sein. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, vol. xxx). Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957. 312 p. Paper covers. $4.50.

Wood, H. G. Freedom and necessity in history; lectures delivered at King's College on 12, 13 and 14 March, 1957. (University of Durham. Riddell Memorial Lectures). London, Oxford University Press, 1957. 68 p. Paper covers. 11s. 3d. (Australian).
Criticises Marxist and other theories of historical inevitability.

NOTES AND NEWS

A.A.P. Congress, 1958

The annual congress will be held at Canberra from Friday, 15th August till Tuesday, 19th August. The Annual General Meeting will take place on Monday, 18th August. All enquiries should be addressed to the congress secretary, Mr. B. Benjamin, Philosophy Department, Canberra University College.

Change of Name of the Association

At the Extraordinary General Meeting of the Association held in Sydney on Tuesday, 4th March, 1958, a special resolution was passed: "that the name of the Association be altered to 'The Australasian Association of Philosophy'". The legal authorisation of this change by the Registrar-General is now in process.